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 1 
Summary 
This thesis evaluates under which circumstances it is advantageous to 
implement the breakthrough rules of the takeover directive. Methodology 
from normative law and economics is used to construct a three-step test 
which allows the breakthrough rules to be tested against varying methods of 
separating control rights from cash-flow rights. 
 
Little evidence is found to support the implementation of the breakthrough 
rules on the level of a member state. This conclusion is based on the fact 
that in some instances the breakthrough rules do not affect the methods used 
to separate cash-flow rights from control rights and that the rules are often 
possible to evade in those cases where the rules do effect the control 
mechanisms. 
 
The same conclusion is reached when the case for implementing the rules is 
studied for an individual company. The possible exception to this negative 
view is the case of initial public offers. The special situation in this case, 
where investors have an increased leverage over the founders of the 
company may produce situations where it could be advantageous to 
implement the breakthrough rules through the corporate charter. The 
requirement to pay compensation to a controlling shareholder whose rights 
are removed by the breakthrough rules is found to affect the utility of the 
rules adversely in these cases.  
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Sammanfattning 
Uppsatsen utvärderar under vilka förhållanden det är förmånligt att införa 
genombrottsreglerna i direktivet om uppköpserbjudanden. Metodologiskt 
används metoder från normativ rättsekonomi för att skapa ett trestegstest. 
Detta test gör det möjligt att pröva genombrottsreglerna mot olika metoder 
för att separera kontroll- och kassaflödesrättigheterna i bolag. 
 
Slutsatsen blir att det finns mycket begränsat stöd för medlemsstaterna att 
välja att införa genombrottsreglerna. Detta baseras på dels det faktum att 
reglerna dels inte påverkar vissa sätt att skaffa sig en kontroll som överstiger 
kassaflödesrättigheterna och dels det faktum att det ofta är möjligt att kringå 
reglerna i de fall de skulle kunna ha verkan. 
 
Samma slutsatser gäller möjligheten att införa genombrottsreglerna för ett 
enskilt bolag. Ett möjligt undantag till denna annars avvisande syn på att 
införa genombrottsreglerna framträder i samband med att börsnoteringar 
studeras. Denna situation är speciell i det att investerarna möjligen har en 
starkare förhandlingsposition vilket i vissa fall kan göra det intressant att 
införa genombrottsreglerna i bolagsordningen. Kravet på att betala 
kompensation för rättigheter som förloras genom genombrottsreglerna 
påverkar deras nytta negativt i dessa fall. 
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Abbreviations 
CJEU  Court of Justice of The European Union 
EEC  European Economic Community 
EU  European Union 
IPO  Initial Public Offering 
US  United States of America 
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1 Introducing the problem 
A hypothetical example shows the different effects of implementing the 
optional breakthrough rules of the takeover directive or not. Having briefly 
commented on the takeover directive the purpose of the thesis, to evaluate 
under what circumstances it is advantageous to implement the breakthrough 
rules is stated. After stating the research questions of the thesis earlier 
research into the desirability of implementing the breakthrough rules is 
noted and the remainder of the thesis is outlined. 
1.1 The different realities facing a bidder 
Consider two hypothetical takeover bids targeting companies within the 
European Union (EU).1 The bids take place within different member states 
of the Union. In both cases someone interested in acquiring the shares of the 
target company makes an offer to purchase them, either with the consent of 
existing controlling shareholders or, in case of a hostile takeover bid without 
such consent.2 The two situations are comparable and in both cases an 
existing non-majority shareholder in practice controls the company.3  
 
The idea that a non-majority shareholder can in practice control a company 
is not far-fetched. In fact, we find that it is in many cases possible to control 
a company while owning less than half of the cash-flow rights through 
different mechanisms.4 This control can stem from control mechanisms 
employed by the controlling shareholder or the costs that the minority 
                                                
1 Shailendra (Shail) Pandit, Takeover strategies in H. Kent Baker and Halil Kiymaz 
(eds.), The art of capital restructuring: creating shareholder value through mergers and 
acquisitions (Wiley, Hoboken, N.J., 2011) 
2 Marco Ventoruzzo Comparative corporate law (West Academic, St. Paul, Minn., 2015) 
519; Pandit (n 1) 323. 
3 Ventoruzzo (n 2) 520 discusses the fact that de facto control of a company can be 
exercised without controlling a majority of the shares or even of the votes at a general 
meeting. 
4 Ventoruzzo (n 2) 520; Lucien A. Bebchuk and Reinier Kraakman and George Triantis, 
Stock Pyramids, Cross Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency 
Costs of Separating Control from cash-Flow Rights in Randall Morck (eds.), Concentrated 
corporate ownership (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2000) 295f. 
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shareholders would have if trying to coordinate their actions.5 In this 
hypothetical example we assume that the controlling shareholder has 
protected its controlling position through differentiated voting rights.6  
 
In one case, national law has implemented the breakthrough rules of 
Directive 2004/25/EC on takeover bids7 which will be referred to as the 
takeover directive throughout the thesis. The voting rights of the shares of 
the target company are in this case equalized with respect to the takeover 
bid despite the efforts of the controlling shareholder to protect its position. 
This raises the possibility of the protective measures put in place by the 
controlling shareholder being neutralized.8 In the other case, the member 
state has opted not to implement the breakthrough rules and they have not 
been voluntarily incorporated into the corporate charter either.9 The end 
result of the breakthrough rules not being implemented is that the 
differentiated voting rights are left untouched, possibly allowing the 
controlling shareholder to maintain control.   
 
The fact that member states and indeed individual companies are given the 
option to implement or not to implement the breakthrough rules is clear 
from the text of the directive.10 What is not self-evident is under what 
conditions it is advantageous for a member state or an individual company 
to choose to implement the breakthrough rules. 
1.2 The affected control mechanisms 
The breakthrough rules are named after their purpose of breaking through or 
modifying control mechanisms that may be used by controlling shareholders 
                                                
5 Bebchuk et. al. (n 4) 295-296 on control mechanisms; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Investor 
Activism: Reshaping the Playing Field? (May 2008 UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ 
Research Paper No. 08-12) 6 on the rational apathy of dispersed shareholders. 
6 Bebchuk et. al. (n 4) 297f contains a short overview of shares with differentiated voting 
power and examples from Sweden. 
7 DIRECTIVE 2004/25/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids. Hereafter cited as the Takeover Directive. 
8 Takeover directive, art 11 contains the breakthrough rules. 
9 Takeover directive, art 12 contains the possibility or right to implement the breakthrough 
rules through the corporate charter. 
10 Takeover directive, art 12. 
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to maintain control over companies. The common denominator is that these 
control mechanisms to some degree separate the power over the company 
from the amount of capital invested in the shares.11 In this thesis, using the 
terminology of Bebchuk, Kraakman and Triantis, the power over the 
company is termed control rights since it signifies the right to control the 
decisions of the company.12 The invested capital is termed cash-flow rights 
since it forms the basis for calculating the right to receive disbursements 
from the company, for example in the form of dividends.13 
 
Ownership structures of listed corporations and the effects on control rights 
can vary considerably. At one extreme are the widely held corporations 
whose dispersed ownership means that no one owner can exert control over 
the company. In this case control rights and cash-flow rights are aligned 
with each other in regard to the shareholders who are in focus in this 
thesis.14 The relationship between shareholders as a class and management 
may well be different in that management may be able to exert control over 
company decisions out of proportion to any cash-flow rights but lies outside 
the scope of this work.15 At the other extreme are found companies where 
one controlling shareholder in practice can dictate the decisions of the 
company or holds an outright majority of the shares.16 This control can also 
be achieved by a small group of shareholders acting in concert.17 
 
In most corporations, a shareholder controlling fifty percent plus one of the 
shares has the ability to control the decisions of the general meeting.18 Due 
                                                
11 Bebchuk et. al. (n 4) 295-296. 
12 Bebchuk et. al. (n 4) 297. 
13 Bebchuk et. al. (n 4) 297. 
14 Bebchuk et. al. (n 4) 295-297. 
15 Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure (July 1, 1976) in Michael C. Jensen, A THEORY 
OF THE FIRM: GOVERNANCE, RESIDUAL CLAIMS AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS, 
(Harvard University Press, December 2000; Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Vol. 3, 
No. 4, 1976) 10-12. 
16 Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating 
the Comparative taxonomy (119 Harv. L. Rev. 2006) 1643. 
17 Gilson (n 14) 1643. 
18 Yu-Hsin Lin, Controlling Controlling-Minority Shareholders: Corporate Governance 
and Leveraged Corporate Control (2017 Colum. Bus. L. rev. 453, 510 2017) 456-458 
establishes the ‘one share/one vote’ principle giving an allocation of voting rights in 
relationship to cash-flow rights as the default condition and gives examples of exceptions to 
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to the fact that small shareholders in many cases do not find it rationally 
worthwhile to expend the resources necessary to discipline management it is 
in practice often not necessary to have outright legal control over a 
corporation to be able to control it in practice.19 It has been reported that it is 
in many cases possible to have practical control of corporate decisions while 
owning significantly less than half of the shares.20 
 
This implies that in practice it is possible to control a corporation without 
owning the matching cash-flow rights.21 Since dividends are paid equally to 
all shareholders in proportion to the cash-flow rights owned it also opens up 
the possibility for a controlling shareholder to siphon of private benefits of 
control that reduce the dividends and to some extent are paid for by the 
remaining majority of shareholders.22 These private benefits of control can 
for example take the form of preferential pricing vis a vis other corporations 
controlled by the same controlling shareholder.23 
 
There are several techniques available to a controlling shareholder who 
wishes to minimize the amount of capital or cash-flow rights required to 
retain control over a particular corporation. Bebchuk, Kraakman and 
Triantis divide these strategies into differential voting rights, stock-pyramids 
                                                
this rule; Wolf-Georg Ringe, Deviations from Ownership-Control Proportionality - 
Economic Protectionism Revisited in COMPANY LAW AND ECONOMIC 
PROTECTIONISM - NEW CHALLENGES TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION U. Bernitz 
and W.G. Ringe, eds., (OUP, 2010; Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 23/2011) 
209-210; Stefan Grundmann and Florian Möslein, Golden Shares - State Control in 
Privatised Companies: Comparative Law, European Law and Policy Aspects (April 2003) 
1-2 discusses the use by states of golden shares to retain a degree of control in companies 
that are being privatized as one exception. 
19 Edward B. Rock The Logic and (Uncertain) significance of Institutional Shareholder 
Activism (79 Goe. L.J, 1991) 455 discusses under what circumstances it is rational for a 
shareholder to expend the necessary resources; Ventoruzzo (n 2) 520 discusses the fact that 
control is in many instances achievable with significantly less than half the votes. 
20 Ventoruzzo (n 2) 520. 
21 Bebchuk et. al. (n 4) p. 295 
22 Luca Enriquez and Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman and Mariana Pargendler, 
The Basic Governance Structure: Minority Shareholders and Non-Shareholder 
Constituencies in Reinier H. Kraakman (ed), The anatomy of corporate law: a comparative 
and functional approach (Third edn, Oxford, 2017) 79-80; Hyun-Chul Lee, The Hidden 
Costs of Private Benefits of Control: Value Shift and Efficiency (29 J. Corp. L. 2004) 720-
721 on the value shifting aspects of private benefits of control. 
23 Lee (n 22) 721 exemplifies private benefits of control. 
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and cross-ownership.24 Of these the differential voting rights are part of the 
corporate charter while the other two techniques lie outside it.25  
 
The theory behind differentiated voting rights as a method for creating a 
controlling minority shareholder position is simple. Some shares are 
assigned a higher number of votes than others that carry the same nominal 
investment.26 There is in theory no limit to the difference in voting power 
and examples of 1000 to 1 ratios have earlier been reported from Sweden.27 
Bebchuk, Kraakman and Triantis report that this at one time allowed the 
company Investor in Sweden to control 95 percent of the votes in Electrolux 
with only 7 percent of the capital and matching cash-flow rights.28 
 
The principle of differentiated voting rights taken to its extreme implies that 
certain shares carry no voting rights at all, for example class C shares in 
Facebook carry no voting rights at all.29 Such shares exist in two forms, 
those that carry a preferential right to dividends and those that do not.30 
Both types exist within the EU with the preferential type being more 
common.31 The preferential non-voting share is not necessarily a method for 
enhanced control, it can also be a way of attracting investment capital by 
more closely tailoring the role of equity to the specific situation at hand.32 
                                                
24 Bebchuk et. al. (n 4) 295. 
25 Bebchuk et. al. (n 4) 297. The authors note that pyramids and cross-ownerships require 
multiple firms. 
26 Bebchuk et. al. (n 4) 297-298. 
27 Lucien Bebchuk and Oliver Hart, A Threat to Dual-Class Shares (Financial Times May 
31, 2002) 1 reported a ratio of 1000 to 1 in the case of the Swedish company Ericsson in 
2002. Presently Swedish corporate law allows a maximum differential of 10 to 1 (4 kap. 5 § 
Aktiebolagslagen (2005:551)).  
28 Bebchuk et. al. (n 4) 298. 
29 Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Shearman & Sterling LLP and European 
Corporate Governance Institute, Report on the Proportionality Principle in the European 
Union (2007) 19. Lin (n 18) 491-493 regarding the case of Facebook. 
30 Ronald J. Gilson and David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital Structure: A Tax 
Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock (February, 2002 Columbia Law and 
Economics Working Paper No. 199; Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 
230) 8-9. 
31 ISS et. al. (n 29) 19. 
32 George C. Triantis, Financial Contract Design in the World of Venture Capital 
(University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 68, Winter 2001) 10-12. 
 10 
The non-preferential type is allowed in some EU member states but is not 
reported to be commonly used.33 
 
Moving beyond the corporate charter corporate pyramids are reported to be 
a more common technique for controlling minority shareholders within the 
EU than differential voting rights.34 This approach uses a series of 
companies, the first one owning a controlling share of the next which might 
then own a controlling share of yet another company.35 With no more than 3 
layers involved it can be shown that it is possible to control the company in 
the third layer while owning as little as 12,5 percent of the corresponding 
cash-flow rights.36 
 
If the corporate pyramid scheme concentrates the control in one company a 
cross-ownership scheme instead spreads it horizontally across a set of 
companies that own shares in each other.37 In this way the relatively small 
share that the controlling owner owns in a given company is augmented by 
the similar blocks owned by other companies in the scheme.38 The net result 
is that the controlling shareholder has a much greater degree of control than 
the cash-flow rights.39 This method for separating control and cash-flow 
rights is also used within the EU but less common and more regulated than 
the use of pyramids.40 
 
Alongside these methods shareholder agreements can also be used to gain 
greater control rights than would otherwise follow from the cash-flow 
rights. By allying him or herself to other shareholders through contractually 
binding agreements a shareholder can create a block of shareholders that 
together have effective control of the corporation.41 This allows a smaller 
                                                
33 ISS et. al. (n 29) 19. 
34 ISS et. al. (n 29) 19. 
35 Bebchuk et. al. (n 4) 298-299. 
36 Bebchuk et. al. (n 4) 298-299. 
37 Bebchuk et. al. (n 4) 299 
38 Bebchuk et. al. (n 4) 299-300. 
39 Bebchuk et. al. (n 4) 299-300. 
40 ISS et. al. (n 29) 22. 
41 Ventoruzzo (n 2) 445. 
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capital investment than would be required in order to have a controlling 
stake without the shareholder agreement.42 
 
These strategies complement each other in practice and have different 
strengths and weaknesses. The charter based strategy has the advantage that 
actions taken in violation of the provisions in many cases are legal nullities 
and have no effect.43 For example, a share transfer in violation of a charter 
provision has no effect.44 On the other hand charter provisions are public 
knowledge and should circumstances change a majority can change them 
against the wishes of the controlling shareholder.45  
 
Using contractual agreements as a strategy for corporate control has the 
possible advantage of being out of the public eye, at least in those 
jurisdictions where they do not need to be disclosed. The agreements are as 
contractual agreements and as such secret and may in the absence of 
legislation demanding disclosure never become public.46 On the other hand 
a violation of the agreement does not imply nullity. Quite to the contrary, a 
share transfer in violation of a shareholder agreement is in many cases 
binding on the seller and buyer. The only recourse for the wronged party to 
the agreement is to sue for damages.47 
 
All these strategies which can serve to give a shareholder control over a 
corporation also protects the controlling shareholders position during a 
takeover bid.  This works in the same way as during the normal operations 
of the corporation by giving control rights in excess of the cash-flow rights 
owned by the controlling shareholder, for example when a general meeting 
votes on defensive measures in conjunction with a takeover bid.48 These 
control rights can then be exercised in case of someone making a takeover 
                                                
42 Ventoruzzo (n 2) 462. 
43 Ventoruzzo (n 2) 425. 
44 Ventoruzzo (n 2) 425. 
45 Ventoruzzo (n 2) 425 notes that shareholder agreements instead of charter provisions in 
some jurisdictions allow the parties to the agreement to keep it secret. 
46 Ventoruzzo (n 2) 425 notes that shareholder agreements in many cases can be kept 
confidential. 
47 Ventoruzzo (n 2) 425. 
48 Takeover directive, art 9 if implemented mandates such a general meeting. 
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bid. They can also be exercised after a takeover where the successful bidder 
has purchased a majority of the cash-flow rights. This could result in a 
situation where a successful bidder does not acquire control over the 
company and allowing the old controlling shareholder to retain control. 
1.3 The takeover directive 
The market for corporate control, of which takeovers is a part, within the 
EU is a matter for national regulation. These national rules are on the other 
hand influenced by the takeover directive which aims to partly harmonize 
the rules regulating the market for corporate takeovers within the EU.49 The 
directive contains several key elements which can be summarized as 
follows: 
 
• Equal treatment of shareholders (article 5) 
• Demands on the information provided to shareholders and public 
disclosure (article 6 and 8) 
• Demands on the time given to shareholders to evaluate a bid (article 
7) 
• Limits to the actions of the board of the target company (article 9) 
• The breakthrough rules (article 11) 
• The right for companies to implement the breakthrough rules in the 
corporate charter in those cases that member states choose to opt-out 
of the rules (article 12) 
• The right of squeeze-out and buyout (article 15 and 16) 
 
The breakthrough rules of article 11 are directly connected with the 
questions of controlling shareholders and their ability to maintain control 
over a corporation without investing a matching amount of capital by setting 
aside charter provisions and shareholder agreements. They do so by 
nullifying any provisions restricting the free transfer of shares, equalizing 
                                                
49 The primacy of EU-law over national law was established by the CJEU in the cases 
26/62 NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v 
Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration. ECR 2 
and 6/64 Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L. (1964) ECR 587. 
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voting rights and giving the successful bidder who has acquired at least 75% 
of the shares the ability to swiftly call a general meeting where any such 
provisions are also set aside and during which the corporate charter can be 
altered.50 They do not, however, affect the functioning of pyramids or cross 
holdings.51 
 
When adopting the takeover directive, the EU made the implementation of 
the breakthrough rules optional and only a small number of countries have 
chosen to implement them.52 In those cases where a member state has 
chosen not to implement the rules it must however allow companies to do so 
through the corporate charter.53 This begs the question under what 
circumstances implementing the rules is an advantageous, either for a 
member state through legislation or for an individual company through its 
charter. 
1.4 Perspective  
Having raised the question of under which circumstances it is advantageous 
for a member state to implement the breakthrough rules the question of 
perspective will be addressed. Put simply, for whom would it be 
advantageous to implement the breakthrough rules? Possible perspectives 
could conceivably include for example controlling shareholders, minority 
shareholders, employees, creditors, and tax-payers.  
 
The answer to this question is taken to be intimately connected to the role of 
corporate law. Pre-empting the discussion in the next section the choice is 
made to study the question from the perspective of society as a whole, 
striving to maximize the utility to the entire society from the use of the 
                                                
50 Takeover directive, art 11 paragraphs 2-4. 
51 Pandit (n 1) 52-53; Bebchuk and Hart (n 27) 1-2. 
52 Takeover directive, art 12 states the possibility for member states to opt out of the 
breakthrough rules. Regarding the number of countries adopting the breakthrough rules see 
European Commision, REPORT FROM THE COMMISION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, Application of Directive 
2004/25/EC on takeover bids (2012) 4 and 8. At the time (2012) 3 member states had 
adopted the rules. 
53 Takeover directive art 12. 
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corporate form. This choice is made in order to achieve a congruence with 
the perceived role of corporate law.54 
1.5 The role of corporate law 
Systematically, rules for corporate takeovers could be considered part of 
corporate law since it concerns the ownership of companies. It could also be 
considered part of contract law since it may be taken to concern contractual 
relationships between shareholders. However, as we shall see one way of 
analysing the competing interests of controlling and minority shareholders is 
through the lens of agency theory.55 
 
Corporate law is to a large extent focused on handling the inevitable 
conflicts of interest that arise between different stakeholders that exist 
within the corporate form.56 One common way of the analysing these 
conflicts within the scope of corporate law is through the use of agency 
theory.57 This means that there is an overlap between takeover regulations 
and corporate law concerning the type of conflict being studied and the 
possibility of using agency theory as a basis for the analysis.58 For this 
reason a choice is made to treat takeover regulations a part of the wider 
sphere of corporate law in this thesis. This choice is echoed by Cahn and 
Donald who discuss the regulation of corporate takeovers in conjunction 
with company law.59 
 
                                                
54 John Armour, Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman and Mariana Pargendler, What is 
Corporate Law? in Reinier H. Kraakman (ed), The anatomy of corporate law: a 
comparative and functional approach (Third edn, Oxford, 2017) 22-24 discusses the role of 
corporate law. 
55 Text to n 125. 
56 Enriquez et. al. (n 22) 50 places this as one of the two main functions of corporate law. 
57 Armour et. al. (n 54) 29-31. 
58 Armour et. al. (n 54) 29-31 discusses the agency conflict inherent in the corporate form. 
The takeover directive addresses both the conflict between shareholders and management 
(through the no frustration rule in article 9) as well as that between controlling and minority 
shareholders (for example through the mandatory bid rule in article 5 and the breakthrough 
rules in article 11). 
59 Andreas Cahn and David C. Donald, Comparative company law: text and cases on the 
laws governing corporations in Germany, the UK and the USA (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2010) p. 756f. 
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The role of corporate law is to be efficient in the sense of minimizing these 
agency costs thus maximizing the utility to be gained from using the 
corporate form.60 In this case efficiency is measured on a societal scale and 
expressed in terms of economic efficiency.61 This focus on economic 
efficiency and in the case of the takeover directive on the relationship 
between different shareholders does not imply that other stakeholders are 
unimportant but that their interests are taken to be better protected through 
other avenues, for example in the case of employees through provisions of 
labour law.62 
 
How this efficiency is to be measured is another question with differing 
proposed answers. One commonly used metric is shareholder value even 
though this is not without its critics.63 Having noted that the role of 
corporate law is to promote economic efficiency the question at the end of 
section 1.2; the question when it is advantageous for a member state or 
individual company to adopt the breakthrough rules can be rephrased once 
again to, when it is economically efficient to do so. In other words, under 
what circumstances are they economically efficient? 
1.6 Purpose of the thesis 
Having said this, we are now in a position to state the purpose of this thesis. 
Being clear over the fact that we are studying the breakthrough rules of the 
take-over directive and having assumed that the role of corporate law is to 
promote economically efficient solutions the purpose of the thesis can be 
stated as: 
 
To evaluate the breakthrough rules of the takeover directive examining 
under what circumstances it is advantageous for a country to adopt them or 
for a corporation to adopt them voluntarily. 
                                                
60 Armour et. al. (n 54) 22-23. 
61 Armour et. al. (n 54) 22-23. 
62 Armour et. al. (n 54) 23. 
63 Armour et. al. (n 54) 23. 
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1.7 Research questions 
The purpose of the thesis is fulfilled by answering a set of specific research 
questions and using these answers to perform an analysis to fulfil the 
purpose. The research questions provide the necessary background for the 
analysis. These questions concern the nature of economic efficiency, the 
breakthrough rules themselves and the economic background against which 
they may be applied. The research questions are: 
 
(1) When and how is it economically efficient to regulate corporate 
takeovers? 
(2) What are the ownership structures and attendant agency conflicts 
against which the effectiveness must be measured? 
(3) How should the breakthrough rules be interpreted legally? 
 
These three questions then provide the necessary background for the final 
analysis which fulfils the purpose of the thesis. 
1.8 Justification of research 
At the moment, few member states have made the breakthrough rules 
mandatory through national corporate law.64 Italy at first chose to 
implement them and previously had a variation on the theme of 
breakthrough rules before the takeover directive set out to harmonize the 
regulation of corporate takeovers in the EU.65 This was changed under the 
Berlusconi government so that at the present date the breakthrough rule is a 
non-mandatory possibility for Italian companies that can be implemented 
through the corporate charter.66 Against this background it could be felt that 
                                                
64 European Commission (n 52) 4 and 8. At the time (2012) 3 member states had adopted 
the rules. 
65 Jonathan Mukwiri, Takeovers and the European Legal Framework A British Perspective 
(Routledge-Cavendish, London and New York, 2009) 115; Cleary Gottlieb, Implementation 
of the Takeover Directive in Italy (2008) 3 mention Italy at first having opted to implement 
the breakthrough rules; Cleary Gottlieb 3 note 8 discusses the earlier Italian rule of a 
breakthrough character. 
66 Pavesio E Associato, Italy takeover Guide (2013) 19-20; Stefano Cachi Pessani and 
Bonelli Erede and Olivier Assant and Bredin Prat and Bernard Roelvink and De Brauw and 
Oliver Rieckers  and Hengeler Mueller and Chris McGaffin and Slaughter and May and 
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it is of little interest to discuss their implementation against the background 
of the apparent non-interest shown by the majority of the member states. 
 
This seeming non-interest does not however preclude that there can be a 
justification for studying a matter from a perspective of economic 
efficiency. Especially since the decision is not simply one that concerns the 
member states. In fact, the directive requires that individual companies be 
given the option to implement the breakthrough rules through the corporate 
charter.67  
 
A reasoned decision in the individual case requires that an analysis of 
possible advantages and disadvantages be made in each individual case. 
While much of the earlier research has been focused on the national level 
and the desirability of making the breakthrough rules mandatory for all 
companies in a jurisdiction this thesis strives to add to the understanding of 
the effects of the breakthrough rules both on a national level and on a 
company level and thus provide some insight into how the question can be 
analysed. A special effort is made to add to the understanding of the 
potential effects of the breakthrough rules in conjunction with Initial Public 
Offers (IPO) where a company turns to the broader public in order to seek 
finance for the first time. 
1.9 Prior research 
Questioning whether or not to implement the breakthrough rules in national 
law is not unique for this thesis. Martynova and Rennebog express a 
negative view of implementing the rules and with reference to Bebchuk and 
Hart express a fear that implementing the rules would lead to controlling 
                                                
Gabriel Núñez and Uría Menéndez, Guide to public takeovers in Europe (2016) 390 and 
Ventoruzzo (n 2) 566-567; Guido Ferrarini and Geoffrey P. Miller, A Simple Theory of 
Takeover Regulation in the United States and Europe (42 Cornell Int'l L.J. 2009) 193 notes 
the reversal of Italian policy under the Berlusconi administration. 
67 Takeover directive art 12 paragraph 2 grants this right to companies in member states that 
have not adopted the breakthrough rules as mandatory. 
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shareholders instead adopting techniques that are not touched by them.68 
Bebchuk and Hart express the view that the net result of the implantation of 
the rules would be to increase the role of pyramid control structures.69 
Blanaid and Clarke point out that the provisions of the breakthrough rules 
allowing a successful bidder to breakthrough existing control mechanisms at 
a general meeting after the takeover can be easily bypassed by the 
controlling owner increasing its stake to slightly more than 25 percent or by 
moving the company outside the EU.70 
 
Berglöf and Burkart hold a more positive view of the breakthrough rules 
going as far as to argue that under some conditions the breakthrough rules 
will in theory lead to efficient control allocation by allowing value-adding 
takeovers and only value-adding takeovers to move forward.71 Their 
endorsement of the breakthrough rule is however not unconditional and they 
like Bebchuk and Hart point out the possibility that controlling shareholders 
who are faced with the breakthrough rules might well choose other control 
mechanisms to retain their controlling position, for example pyramid 
structures.72 
 
Berglöf and Burkart are prepared to accept the breakthrough rules from at 
least a theoretical point of view, at least in those cases where the controlling 
shareholder is in the financial position to make a counterbid.73 They 
however, seem to constitute a minority opinion as evidenced by Blanaid and 
Clarke whose list of critics of the breakthrough rules is long and varied.74 
                                                
68 Marina Martynova and Luc Renneboog, Takeover Regulation in H. Kent Baker and Halil 
Kiymaz, Halil (eds.), The art of capital restructuring: creating shareholder value through 
mergers and acquisitions (Wiley, Hoboken, N.J., 2011) 52-53. 
69 Bebchuk and Hart (n 27) 1-2. 
70 Blanaid Clarke, Takeover Regulation - Through the Regulatory Looking Glass (8 
German L.J. 381, 412, 2007) 397. 
71 Erik Berglöf and Mike Burkart, European Takeover Regulation (18 ECONOMIC 
POLICY 171, 2003) 199f which includes a more formal justification based on security 
yield and the value of private benefits of control. 
72 Berglöf and Burkart (n 71) 202. 
73 Berglöf and Burkhart (n 71) 199. 
74 Clarke (n 70) 397 notes 55 and 56 where critics of the breakthrough rules are listed in the 
voluminous note 56. 
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On balance, the stance of much of the academic community seems to be at 
least sceptical of implementing the breakthrough rules. 
 
Noting that few countries have adopted the rules to date the political 
reception of the breakthrough rules has not been overwhelming. 75 Without 
carrying out a comparative analysis of national law it can be noted that few 
countries have adopted the rules to date. No attempt has been made to 
investigate to which degree companies in countries that have not 
implemented the breakthrough rules have chosen to do so voluntarily. 
1.10 Outline 
The thesis consists of 4 parts aside from this introduction. Chapter 2 
discusses the methodology. Thereafter three chapters discuss the economic 
and legal theory used in the analysis. These chapters answer the three 
research questions. In chapter three economic theory is used to define a 
measure of efficiency which can be applied. In chapter four the diverse 
economic realities which the analysis must handle are discussed and in 
chapter five the breakthrough rules are analysed. In the third section the 
question of when it is advantageous to adopt the breakthrough rules is 
analysed in chapter six. Finally, chapter seven concludes the thesis by 
drawing conclusions from the preceding analysis thus fulfilling the purpose 
of the thesis. 
                                                
75 European Commission (n 50) 4 and 8. At the time (2012) 3 member states had adopted 
the rules. 
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2 Methodology 
A multi-pronged approach to the methodology of the thesis is described. 
First a three-step test to define under what circumstances the breakthrough 
rules are advantageous, thereafter it is discussed how to isolate the different 
methods of exerting control used by controlling shareholders and how to 
interpret the legal rules of the takeover directive. Finally, it is discussed how 
the analysis fulfilling the purpose of the thesis is to be carried out. 
2.1 Introduction 
It was stated in the introduction that an economic perspective is to be used 
in evaluating the breakthrough rules.76 This implies using theories from a 
discipline outside the strictly legal science to investigate a set of legal rules, 
in this case economic theory.77 This foray outside of the strictly legal  
science into the realms of economics in the form of the discipline of law and 
economics has become common over the last few decades.78 Even if the use 
of an economic analysis in a legal setting has become quite widely accepted 
there exist differing schools of thought regarding how such an analysis 
should be carried out.79 This chapter sets out the methodology to be used 
when analysing under what circumstances it is advantageous to implement 
the breakthrough rules. 
 
Referring back to the research questions of the thesis, these touched upon 
several items of a diverse nature.80 They covered questions of economic 
efficiency, finance and how to interpret EU-law. Theories that can be used 
to analyse these questions must be found and assessed. Finally, a structured 
                                                
76 Text to n 54. 
77 Francesco Parisi, Positive, Normative and Functional Schools in Law and Economics 
(European Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 259-272, December 2004, 
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 04-22) 2-3; Vladimir Bastidas 
Venegas, Rättsekonomi in Fredric Korling and Mauro Zamboni, Mauro (eds.), Juridisk 
metodlära (Studentlitteratur, Lund 2013) 175.  
78 Parisi (n 77) 2-3 
79 Parisi (n 77) 8. 
80 Text before that to n 64. 
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approach to the final analysis is required. This indicates that a multi-
pronged methodological approach which can address these different areas is 
necessary. Notwithstanding this, the thesis is firmly rooted in the 
methodology of law and economics. Therefore, it is desirable to begin by 
positioning the thesis within this field as utilizing either a positive, 
normative or functional approach to the subject.81 
2.2 Choosing a normative approach 
Pacces and Visscher state that a positive analysis aims to predict the 
consequences of legal rules.82 Parisi links the positive school of thought to 
scholars such as Posner and to the hypothesis that common law better than 
legislation can further the efficient functioning of society.83 A normative 
analysis on the other hand aims to make policy recommendations and 
suggest advantageous legal rules.84 Parisi notes that that the normative 
approach tends to see a greater role for legal intervention than the positive 
approach.85 
 
Pacces and Visscher question a complete division between positive and 
normative aspects of law and economics, noting that a positive analysis may 
well contain normative aspects and vice versa.86 Parisi states that a third 
approach, the functional approach combines elements of both approaches 
and combines them with public choice theory to form a third and separate 
approach to examining the legal system using economic tools.87 
 
The purpose of the thesis has predominantly normative aspects since its 
purpose is to make recommendations on whether or not to adopt the 
                                                
81 Parisi (n 77) 8-11 contains an overview of these different approaches to law and 
economics. 
82 Alessio M. Pacces, and Louis T. Visscher, Methodology of Law and Economics (Bart van 
Klink and Sanne Taekema (Eds.), Law and Method. Interdisciplinary research into Law 
(Series Politika, nr 4, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2011, pp. 85-107) 4. 
83 Parisi (n 77) 9. 
84 Pacces and Visscher (n 82) 4 and Parisi (n 77) 10. 
85 Parisi (n 77) 10. 
86 Pacces and Visscher (n 82) 4. 
87 Parisi (n 77) 10. 
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breakthrough rules.88 At the same time making policy recommendations 
necessarily entail understanding their consequences, bordering on a positive 
analysis. The choice is made to utilize a normative approach based on the 
fact that the purpose of the thesis is to discuss the desirability of introducing 
the breakthrough rules, in other words making policy recommendations.  
2.3 The economic methodology 
Having chosen a normative approach to the subject it is now possible to 
discuss what this entails and the detailed methodology to be used. Pacces 
and Visscher summarize the normative approach to law and economics as 
follows: 
 
“Normative law and economics is carried out as follows. Law is 
analysed from an economic perspective, which, in the mainstream law 
and economics, is the rational choice theory. Policy recommendations 
are derived on the basis of economic analysis. In order to be able to 
provide such recommendations, it is necessary to develop a 
framework for assessing the relative desirability of different 
outcomes.”89 
 
For the present purpose, the framework must be able to answer the question 
whether or not it is advantageous to implement the breakthrough rules in a 
particular case. This entails ranking the two alternatives which are to either 
implement the breakthrough rules or to leave the matter unregulated. This 
would leave the matter to the market for corporate control as perfect or 
imperfectly functioning as it may be. From the role of corporate law, we 
know that we are to recommend the alternative that is more efficient.90 The 
framework must therefore be able to discern the most efficient alternative. 
 
A basic assumption guiding the field of law and economics is the 
assumption that parties to the transactions are rational maximizers meaning 
that they strive to maximize their personal gain from any transaction based 
on rational behaviour.91 The question of what they are maximizing, utility or 
                                                
88 Section 1.6 states the purpose of the thesis 
89 Pacces and Visscher (n 82) 4. 
90 Armour et. al. (n 54) 22-23. 
91 Parisi (n 77) 5. 
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wealth is discussed in a later section and it is assumed that wealth or money 
in the form of share value is to be used as at least a proxy of what the actors 
are maximizing for the purposes of this thesis.92 Either they are maximizing 
utility or wealth we must therefore assume that the actors involved in a 
takeover bid will act so that their personal utility or wealth is maximized. 
Should this lead to a suboptimal solution on a societal scale the task of 
creating a situation where this also leads to societal efficiency is left to 
corporate law. 
 
Pacces’ and Visscher’s article on the methodology of law and economics is 
taken as a starting point for both this section on methodology and when the 
framework is constructed in chapter 3. This is based on the fact that its 
extensive references and bibliography allow a quick reference to the concept 
of economic efficiency as used in law and economics.93 Their text above all 
touches on questions of what constitutes efficiency. To this is added the 
question if it can be expected that a proposed and theoretically effective rule 
can be expected to fulfil its purpose in practice.94 
 
The framework is constructed in the next chapter and consists of a three-part 
test, the first two questions of which are more theoretical and concern the 
need for rulemaking and what constitutes efficiency in regard to takeover 
bids. The first question concerning the need for intervention in the market 
takes as its starting points agency theory and Gilson’s view that controlling 
shareholders are not per definition a bad thing. Working from these, 
indicators are found that imply a risk that the market would arrive at non-
optimal solutions. 
 
For the second test, that of theoretical suitability the starting point is the 
theoretical model used by Berglöf and Burkart. They state that some 
takeovers are value-adding and thus desirable from a viewpoint of 
                                                
92 Text to n 115 and 116. 
93 Pacces and Visscher (n 82) 14-16 contains an extensive bibliography. 
94 This is based not the least on the discrepency between the theoretical model constructed 
by Berglöf and Burkart which shows that in theory the breakthrough rules will give an 
optimal solution and the scepticism shown by Bebchuk and Hart over the likelihood that 
this would be the case in reality. 
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efficiency.95 The existence of private benefits of control are an important 
factor in their analysis and affects the price required for a controlling 
shareholder to be willing to sell their stake in a company.96 The test that is 
devised based on their theoretical understanding strives to identify situations 
where a controlling shareholder would rationally block an otherwise value-
adding takeover bid thus potentially allowing the breakthrough rules to 
increase the efficiency of the market for corporate control by allowing these 
value-adding transactions to go forward in spite of the existence of 
controlling shareholders. 
 
The final test strives to identify situations where the breakthrough rules 
although in theory efficient would not have the desired effect in practice. 
This is done by noting situations where scholars have argued that this would 
be the case and discussing whether or not the studied situation is one of 
these.97 
2.4 The economic background 
Since the main thrust of the thesis is to evaluate under what circumstances 
the breakthrough rules have potential to be effective it is necessary to 
explore the differing conditions under which they may operate.  Since the 
focus is not on a comparative analysis it is not necessary to examine in 
detail the actual conditions in member states, a more general outline of 
reported circumstances is sufficient especially since countries are not 
monolithic, situations vary between companies within the same country.98  
 
A general search of academic articles concerning methods for separating 
control rights from cash-flow rights is conducted. This gives an overview of 
the theoretically available methods and an indication of their prevalence 
                                                
95 Berglöf and Burkart (n 71) 197 and 199. 
96 Berglöf and Burkart (n 71) 199. 
97 Bebchuk and Hart (n 27) 1-2 for example note situations where they mean that the 
breakthrough rules might even be counterproductive by pushing controlling shareholders 
into other control mechanisms. 
98 Gilson (n 16) 1645-1647 contains a short overview of variations between selected 
countries but also shows that in no case is the situation within a particular country 
monolithic. 
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within the member states of the EU. Against the background of the 
increased use of control mechanisms in conjunction with initial public 
offerings reported from the US an extra effort is made to survey this 
situation.99 
2.5 The legal methodology 
Having discussed how to construct the framework to test the breakthrough 
rules against differing strategies for a controlling shareholder to retain 
control a thorough understanding of the rules themselves is necessary. 
Interpreting the rules is a question for not economic theory but legal 
methodology. This section lays out the basic methodology used to interpret 
EU-legislation and the interpretation itself is found in chapter five. 
 
The takeover directive is not immediately applicable but is instead 
implemented in national law.100 While transposing the directive to national 
law the member states are expected to be loyal to the EU and the purpose of 
the legislation being implemented.101 Furthermore, when faced with a 
conflict between national law and the requirements of the underlying EU-
legislation it has long been the clear policy of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) that EU-law as interpreted by the CJEU has 
primacy over national law.102 National courts are expected to interpret 
national law in such a way as to create the greatest possible compliance with 
the underlying EU-legislation.103 
 
Since this thesis is concerned with the more abstract possibility of 
implementing the breakthrough rules than any specific implementation of 
them it is possible to look only at the rules as they are written in the 
directive and interpret them using methods appropriate for interpreting EU-
                                                
99 Lin (n 18) 462. 
100 Takeover directive art 21. 
101 Treaty on the European Union art 4.3.  
102 The primacy of EU law was first articulated by the CJEU in the case 6/64 Flaminio 
Costa v E.N.E.L. (1964) ECR 587. 
103 14/83 Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen (1984) 
ECR 1892 where the CJEU laid down this principle. 
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legislation. The directive is part of the legal system of the EU which forms a 
separate legal system from that of the member states.104 The method of 
interpretation is also separate from that of the member states and not 
dependant on that of any particular member state.105 
 
The CJEU is commonly held to use a teleological method in those cases 
where a textual interpretation of legislation is not sufficient.106 This implies 
interpreting the legislation in the way that helps achieve the goals of the 
legislation and the union the most.107 One goal apart from the basic goals of 
the treaties that has according to this view consistently been given a high 
priority by the CJEU is furthering the integration of the union.108 The debate 
is not so much over if the CJEU has used a teleological approach so much as 
to whether or not it still does so.109 This debate is at the same time tempered 
by the fact that as the legal system of the EU has evolved there are fewer 
gaps available to be filled by products of teleological interpretation, it may 
be that the court still uses a teleological method in uncertain cases but there 
are fewer such cases.110 For this thesis it will be assumed that this is the case 
and that a teleological method is appropriate. 
 
Case law is in no sense unimportant when interpreting EU-legislation since 
the CJEU is the final interpreter of EU-legislation. However, the court itself 
is by some considered to be less than stringent in its handling of earlier case 
law complicating the task of interpretation.111 The absence of case law with 
                                                
104  Jane Reichel, EU-rättslig metod in Fredric Korling and Mauro Zamboni, Mauro 
(eds.), Juridisk metodlära (Studentlitteratur, Lund 2013)109 with reference to the case 
26/62 NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v 
Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration. ECR 2 
105 Reichel (n 104) 109-110. 
106 Ulla Neergard and Ruth Nielsen, Where Did the Spirit and Its Friends Go? On the 
European Legal Method(s) and the Interpretational Style of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union in Ulla B. Neergaard and Ruth Nielsen and Lynn M. Roseberry 
(ed.), European legal method: paradoxes and revitalisation (DJØF, Copenhagen, 2011) 
109. 
107 Neergard and Nielsen (n 106) 110 citing judge Pescatore and 112-113 citing Maduro. 
108 Neergard and Nielsen (n 106) 114-115 and 127. 
109 Neergard and Nielsen (n 106) 127. 
110 Neergard and Nielsen (n 106) 127. 
111 Neergard and Nielsen (n 106) 134. 
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regard to the breakthrough rules makes this issue a moot point which will 
not be further discussed.112 
 
To summarize, should the need arise to interpret any part of the 
breakthrough rules a teleological approach is to be used in the absence of 
case law. If no other goals have been stated for the directive it is possible to 
argue that the interpretation should further the fundamental goals of the 
union and a closer integration. 
2.6 The analysis 
Varying control mechanisms and their implications are surveyed in chapter 
four. This creates a list of basic situations that are of interest. The items on 
this list are then tested using the framework from chapter three to identify 
the situations where the breakthrough rules are advantageous in the sense of 
creating efficient solutions not only in theory but also in reality. In this 
analysis, the breakthrough rules are used as they were interpreted in chapter 
five. 
                                                
112 Text to n 196 discusses the absence of case law from the CJEU. 
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3 Economic theory 
A three-step test to determine if it is advantageous in a given situation to 
implement the breakthrough rules or not is developed. The three steps are a 
test of necessity, a test of theoretical suitability and finally a test of practical 
suitability. Only if a proposed implementation passes all three tests will it be 
considered advantageous to implement the breakthrough rules. The 
development of this test as the framework required in normative law and 
economics also answers the first research question. 
3.1 Introduction 
According to Pacces and Visscher normative law and economics is 
characterized by using a framework to rank the available options according 
to their desirability. 113 This chapter is devoted to creating the framework 
needed to analyse when it is advantageous to implement the breakthrough 
rules. This is done by combining existing theories articulated by different 
scholars that touch upon the different aspects of corporate takeovers. In 
many cases there exist competing views, for example not every scholar 
agrees that agency theory is the only or proper way the analyse the corporate 
form.114 
 
In this case we are not faced with a series of options that need to be ranked. 
Instead we are faced with a number of different control mechanisms such as 
differentiated voting rights or cross-holdings. The task of the framework is 
therefore not to rank different alternatives in terms of desirability but instead 
to judge if the breakthrough rules have the potential to create an efficient 
situation under a given circumstance. To do this a framework will be 
constructed in the form of a test that given a specific ownership 
configuration tells us if the breakthrough rules are advantageous or not. 
                                                
113 Pacces and Visscher (n 82) 4. 
114 Jensen and Meckling (n 15) 7-9 note the view of the firm as a nexus of contracts. 
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3.2 Made assumptions 
It is not possible within the format of this thesis to discuss and defend every 
underlying assumption fully. The choice has instead been made to openly 
state certain assumptions that have been made: 
 
• It is assumed that it is not efficient to regulate such situations where 
market mechanisms have already created a reasonably efficient 
solution. 
• It is assumed that if a proposed regulation will likely not work in 
practice it should not be enacted. 
• Based not least on the difficulty of performing interpersonal 
comparisons of utility it is assumed that efficiency will be measured 
by maximizing wealth.115 
• It is assumed that share-value will be used if it is necessary to 
compare different levels of wealth. This is not inconsistent with the 
views of many scholars even if dissenting views exist.116 
 
3.3 Outlining a three-step test 
Earlier, the conclusion was drawn that a test was a suitable form for the 
framework that is at the heart of normative law and economics. This was 
based on the fact that the objective is not to rank different alternatives but 
instead to draw one of two possible conclusions. Either it is advantageous to 
implement the breakthrough rules in a given situation or it is not. This does 
not preclude the test from consisting of several steps where the proposed 
regulation has to pass all the steps in order for it to be advantageous. 
 
                                                
115 Pacces and Vischer (n 82) 6 contains a discussion on interpersonal comparisons. 
116 Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: 
Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices (59 Stan. L. Rev. 2007) 1526ff regarding 
prioritizing shareholder value; Margaret M. Blair and Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production 
Theory of Corporate Law (24 J. Corp. L. 1999) 751-752 take issue with the primacy of 
shareholder value. 
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Remembering that the role of corporate law is to promote efficiency in order 
to maximize utility on a societal level the overarching test is whether or not 
the breakthrough rules will cause economically efficient takeovers to move 
forward while not artificially favouring inefficient bids.117 It was assumed 
above that in those cases where the market is capable of arriving at efficient 
solutions without regulation it is best left unregulated. Based on this 
assumption a first sub-test is to question the necessity of implementing the 
breakthrough rules to begin with. Put in other words; is there something in 
the situation that would be affected by the breakthrough rules and that the 
market for corporate control is unable to handle. 
 
If it is found that in a given situation the market for corporate control risks 
not arriving at an efficient end-state on its own the case for regulation passes 
the first test which will be called the test of necessity. In these cases, a 
second test will be applied. This test which will be called a test of 
theoretical suitability will test whether or not the breakthrough rules can in 
principle address the risk that the market-based solution will not be 
efficient. Should this not be the case the breakthrough rules serve little 
purpose in the specific case and fails the test of theoretical suitability. 
 
Having established two tests, that of necessity and that of theoretical 
suitability, attention is now turned to reproducing the effects in practice. 
This choice is made against the backdrop of Bebchuk’s and Harts’ criticism 
of the breakthrough rules where they hypothesize that controlling 
shareholders may choose to change from for example differentiated voting 
rights which are affected by the breakthrough rules as a tactic for retaining 
control to for example utilizing a pyramid scheme which is not. 
 
This third test, called a test of practical suitability tests whether or not the 
breakthrough rules are likely to have the desired theoretical effect in 
practice. This decision is made against the backdrop of the assumption that 
                                                
117 Armour et. al. (n 54) 22-23 regarding the role of corporate law. Berglöf and Burkart (n 
71) 197 and 199 on what constitutes efficient takeovers. 
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regulations which are not likely to have the desired effect in practice should 
not be implemented. 
 
Having outlined a three-step test against which the breakthrough rules can 
be evaluated it is now time to discuss these factors in greater detail. This is 
done in three sections discussing the three parts of the test and finally a 
concluding section summarises the test that will be applied to the 
breakthrough rules. 
3.4 Test 1; is it necessary 
3.4.1 Introduction 
The first test we wish to apply to the implementation of the breakthrough 
rules is a test of necessity. We want to know if it is really necessary to 
regulate the issue at hand or if the market can be left to handle the question. 
This section will not be an exhaustive evaluation of all possible reasons why 
the breakthrough rules may be needed, instead it will concentrate primarily 
on the implications of agency theory in situations with a non-majority 
controlling shareholder. This decision is based on the common use of 
agency theory in discussions regarding corporate law.118 Besides agency 
theory Gilson’s view on beneficial and harmful controlling shareholders will 
be discussed since it to some extent balances the view inherent in agency 
theory that agency conflicts are inherently costly.119 
3.4.2 Agency theory 
Agency theory starts with the corporate form itself noting that within the 
corporation there are shareholders, management and other stakeholders.120 It 
further notes that these groups may have different goals that can come into 
                                                
118 Martin Gelter, The Dark Side of Shareholder Influence: Toward a Holdup Theory of 
Stakeholders in Comparative Corporate Governance (March 17, 2008 ECGI - Law 
Working Paper No. 096/2008; CLEA 2008 Meetings Paper; Harvard Olin Fellows' 
Discussion Paper No. 17/2008) 4 goes as far as calling the principle agent paradigm” The 
predominant academic view”. 
119 Jensen and Meckling (n 15) 5 note that “… there is good reason to believe that the agent 
will not always act in the best interests of the principal.”. 
120 Gelter (n 118) 4-5. 
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conflict with each other.121 For example, the lately discussed question of 
management compensation could be analysed from an agency 
perspective.122 Shareholders have a natural wish to maximize dividends 
while management has an equally natural wish to maximize their own 
compensation even at the expense of dividends.123 
 
The breakthrough rules concern the relationships between different 
shareholders. They do this by targeting control mechanisms employed by 
controlling shareholders.124 For this reason, the agency conflict of greatest 
interest to this discussion is that between minority shareholders and 
controlling shareholders.  
 
The minority shareholders are present as investors and their dominant 
interest in the company is to receive a return on investment, according to La 
Porta et. al. preferably in the form of dividends for reasons of the time-value 
of money even if a rise in share value is a possibility.125 Dividends are paid 
from past and present profits while estimates of proper share value 
commonly takes in account all present and future disbursements, primarily 
dividends, from the company to the shareholders.126 These disbursements 
stem from the profits of the company meaning that in both cases the investor 
as a residual claimant is dependent on profits for his or her return on 
investment.127  
 
A dominant shareholder on the other hand may have other interests besides 
that of making possible the largest possible dividends. This stems from the 
fact that a controlling owner, and management for that matter, may have the 
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possibility to extract private benefits of control from the company.128 These 
can take various forms, for example preferential pricing in relation to 
another company controlled by the same owner, but have the common 
characteristic that they do not benefit the all shareholders equally.129 
 
Any private benefits of control extracted by a controlling shareholder are 
paid for by all shareholders in relation to their share of cash-flow rights in 
the form of reduced dividends.130 A controlling shareholder with small cash-
flow rights can therefore in theory let the other shareholders subsidize his or 
her private benefits of control.131 This means that there can exist a 
divergence of interest between controlling and minority shareholders where 
the controlling shareholder is more interested in maximizing the private 
benefits of control than the profits.132 
 
The private benefits of control have a value to the controlling shareholder 
that added to the share value might exceed what a bidder is offering in a 
takeover bid.133 Theoretically it is this value that provides an incentive for a 
large shareholder to accept the information-gathering costs inherent in 
exerting control over management.134 Without being compensated through 
private benefits of control it would simply not be worth it for a large 
shareholder to discipline management. 
 
A bidder is however, not allowed to offer the controlling shareholder a 
higher price than others.135 The fact that all shareholders must be offered the 
same price in a takeover bid means that a controlling shareholder might turn 
down a takeover bid that is economically efficient by being value adding as 
insufficient since it does not compensate for the value of the lost private 
                                                
128 La Porta et. al. (n 125) 5-6. 
129 La Porta et. al. (n 125) 5-6. 
130 La Porta et. al. (n 125) 4; Bebchuk et. al. (n 4) 308-309. 
131 Bebchuk et. al. (n 4) 308-309 This follows from the fact that private benefits of control 
reduce the profits and thereby the possible dividends equally in relation to the cash-flow 
rights but are only available to a subset of the shareholders. 
132 Shleifer and Vishny (n 122) 758. 
133 Berglöf and Burkart (n 71) 199. 
134 Gilson (n 14) 1651 
135 Berglöf and Burkart (n 71) 197 discusses the mandatory bid rule of article 5 of the 
takeover directive. 
 34 
benefits of control.136 The controlling owner may also have the ability to not 
only turn down the offer regarding his or her shares but also to in practice 
affect any defensive measures taken by the company or to make a bid not 
worthwhile to the presumptive bidder even if he or she owns less than half 
the cash-flow rights.137  
 
This stems from the fact that for example differential voting rights may 
allow the incumbent controlling shareholder to retain control even after a 
successful takeover bid. This would in turn reduce any bidders interest in 
making a bid. The existence of controlling but non-majority shareholders is 
thus an indication that the market may not be able to handle takeovers in an 
economically efficient manner. 
3.4.3 Controlling shareholders, not always 
harmful 
Gilson holds the view that controlling shareholders and the extraction of 
private benefits of control are not intrinsically harmful.138 He states that a 
controlling shareholder may serve to discipline management and that 
provided that the benefits being extracted are less than the efficiency gained 
from this, minority shareholders actually stand to win from the existence of 
a controlling shareholder.139 The analysis that minority shareholders can 
stand to gain from the disciplining of management is echoed by Lin.140 
 
Gilson instead proposes that the question of whether the existence of a 
controlling shareholder is beneficial or not to the minority shareholders is 
instead tied to the question of good and bad law as well as the size of the 
private benefits of control being extracted.141 His conclusion is that under 
conditions of good law and low private benefits of control in many cases the 
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minority shareholders  stand to benefit from the existence of a controlling 
shareholder compared to a situation where no party is able to discipline 
management.142 
 
Translating this into a test for the necessity of regulating takeovers with 
regard to controlling shareholders we must therefore be observant of the two 
factors, bad law and the size of private benefits of control. While the first 
factor is country-specific the second factor may reasonably vary between 
companies within the same jurisdiction. Based on Gilson’s reasoning, 
should both these factors be present it is a sign that the market may well be 
unable to arrive at an efficient solution on its own. 
3.4.4 The test of necessity 
The first test that a proposal to implement the breakthrough rules must pass 
if it is to be considered efficient is therefore the test of necessity. The 
situation must be such that the market is not likely to arrive at a satisfactory 
solution on its own. We have noted three different factors as important in 
indicating a need for regulation. These are: 
 
• The existence of controlling non-majority shareholders 
• The existence of bad law 
• The size of private benefits of control commonly being extracted. 
 
Should controlling shareholders be absent the other two factors have no 
independent function. They simply serve to strengthen the case for 
regulation in the presence of controlling shareholders. 
3.5 Test 2, will it work in theory 
3.5.1 Introduction 
Having defined a test of necessity the discussion now turns to examining if a 
proposed implementation of the breakthrough rules has the theoretical 
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ability to create an effective solution. In order to define the term effective, 
we borrow heavily from Berglöf’s and Burkart’s article on takeover 
regulation which contains a definition of which takeovers should be 
considered beneficial.143 
3.5.2 Berglöf and Burkart 
Berglöf’s and Burkart’s model has the basic premise that those takeover 
bids that add value and only those bids are advantageous.144 The two 
components that they assign to the value of a company are the return on 
investments which they term security yield and the private benefits of 
control that a controlling shareholder can extract.145 They further posit that a 
takeover is value increasing if the sum of these components is greater after a 
successful bid than before.146 
 
Given a static condition it could be thought that the sums of security yield 
and private benefits of control would be equal, the target company has the 
same capability of generating a return on investment irrespective of 
ownership. A takeover situation is however dynamic in the sense that the 
new owners may have different priorities and capabilities. They may value 
the possibility to extract private benefits of control differently in a situation 
where they seek a controlling position or may have a greater ability to create 
a higher return on their investment.147 For these reasons the value of the 
company may differ under different ownerships and there is scope for both 
value increasing and value decreasing takeover bids. 
 
The reason that a controlling shareholder may decline a value-adding 
takeover bid is that the benefits of control are not evenly distributed, they 
are instead concentrated with the controlling shareholder.148 This results in 
the average value per share to the controlling shareholder being higher than 
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the average value taken over all shares.149 In extreme cases with a large 
imbalance between control power and cash-flow rights the difference can 
theoretically become large.150 
 
Should it be the case that the value to the controlling owner is higher than 
the average value per share offered by the rivalling bidder the controlling 
owner will decline to sell under the assumption that he is acting 
rationally.151 In such a situation a value adding transaction may well be 
blocked by the controlling owner, this case may in fact be exacerbated by 
the equitable price rule of the takeover directive which requires that a bidder 
offer all existing shareholders the same price, thus making it impossible to 
compensate only the incumbent controlling shareholder for his loss of 
private benefits of control.152 
 
The key to this question is the relationship between the value added by the 
takeover and the size of the private benefits of control in relation to the 
cash-flow rights owned by the incumbent controlling shareholder. The 
smaller the cash-flow rights owned by the existing controlling shareholder 
the greater the value of the private benefits of control as a percentage of the 
value of the security yield. This in turn requires a higher price from the 
bidder to lead to acceptance. Since the bidder is forced to offer all owners 
the same price this may lead to a situation where a successful bid would 
require a price higher than the value to the bidder even if the bidder were to 
be able to create a large added value. 
 
Put in numbers this reasoning can be described in a simple example. 
Suppose that the security yield of all shares is 1000 and that the present 
controlling shareholder extracts private benefits of control to the amount of 
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100. Suppose further that the incumbent owns 25 percent of the cash flow 
rights. The sum total of the security yield and the value of the private 
benefits of control is 1100 before the bid and 350 of this value accrues to the 
controlling shareholder. If a potential bidder can add value worth at least 
300 bringing the total value to 1400 and makes an offer at this level the 
controlling shareholder is offered 25 % of 1400 which is 350. At this level, 
continued ownership or selling carries the same value and considering the 
time-value of money it would be rational to sell.153 
 
Should the incumbent’s percentage of cash-flow rights be as low as 10 % 
the situation becomes drastically different.154 In this case the value to the 
incumbent is 200 but the bid must increase to at least 2000 for it to be 
rational for the controlling shareholder to accept the bid. It is vastly less 
likely that a potential bidder should be able to increase the value by 81 % 
than by 27% and be able to create a bid that will be accepted by the 
incumbent controlling shareholder. The takeover which would clearly add 
value will therefore probably not take place. 
 
Thus, the likelihood of a controlling shareholder blocking a value-adding 
takeover bid is to a large extent dependant on two factors. These are the size 
of the private benefits of control and the degree of difference between 
control rights and cash-flow rights. The breakthrough rules are theoretically 
effective in both these cases by aligning the control and cash-flow rights 
more closely to each other in those cases where the control mechanisms 
used by the controlling shareholder are affected by the breakthrough rules.  
 
As Bebchuk and Hart point out not all control mechanisms are affected by 
the breakthrough rules.155 In those cases, for example pyramids, that are 
unaffected, the breakthrough rules cannot be effective from a theoretical 
point of view since they do not have the ability in these cases to realign 
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control rights with cash-flow rights. In these cases, there is no point in 
implementing the breakthrough rules. 
3.5.3 The test of theoretical suitability 
The second test is one of theoretical suitability. It tests whether or not the 
breakthrough rules are in theory capable of creating an effective solution in 
a certain situation. The key points to look out for are the degree of 
separation of control rights from cash-flow rights and the ability of the 
breakthrough rules to affect this. If there is large degree of separation of 
control rights from cash-flow rights, especially combined with a potential 
for the extraction of large private benefits of control and the breakthrough 
rules are able to realign the control rights with the cash-flow rights they are 
theoretically efficient. 
3.6 Test 3, can it be circumvented 
3.6.1 Introduction 
Should it be found that a proposed implementation of the breakthrough rules 
would indeed be necessary in the light of the fact that the market is unable 
to arrive at an efficient solution unaided and that the rules can theoretically 
achieve an efficient outcome we arrive at the final test, that of practical 
suitability. It is assumed that there is no point in choosing to implement the 
rules if it is possible for example for a controlling shareholder to bypass 
them or if some other practical consideration makes it unlikely that they will 
be effective.  
 
The effects of the need to pay compensation to the controlling shareholder 
will be explored separately. Should the requirement to pay compensation 
render a takeover bid prohibitively expensive it can be called into question if 
the rules are suitable in practice. This will be discussed after the main 
analysis when conclusions are drawn. 
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3.6.2 Evasion of the rules 
Bebchuk and Hart note that there are control mechanisms such as pyramids 
that are not affected by the breakthrough rules and which can be used to 
evade the breakthrough rules.156 One part of this test must therefore clearly 
be to discuss the possibility of evading an implementation of the 
breakthrough rules by switching to another method for separating control 
rights from cash-flow rights. 
 
Should it be found that it is in practice possible to evade the breakthrough 
rules by switching to another control mechanism they will have little or no 
effect. In such a case, a proposal to implement the rules fails the test of 
practical suitability. 
3.6.3 The test of practical suitability 
This third and final test aims to find in which cases implementing the 
breakthrough rules will not have the desired result in practice even though it 
should theoretically do so. It does so by posing the following question: 
 
• Is it difficult or prohibitively costly to evade the effect of the 
breakthrough rules for the controlling shareholder? 
 
The breakthrough rules are only efficient in practice as well as in theory if 
the answer to this question is yes. 
3.6.4 The effects of paying compensation 
The breakthrough rules do not simply strip the controlling shareholder of its 
rights, they also promise equitable compensation for any losses incurred by 
the breakthrough directive.157 This potential cost must be added to the bid 
price that must be offered to the existing shareholders for the bid to be 
accepted by a potential bidder. This can in principle lead to one of two 
different situations; either the bidder is forced to first pay a price high 
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enough to entice the controlling shareholder to accept the bid despite the 
value of the private benefits of control and then pay compensation or the 
controlling shareholder will accept a lower bid knowing that he will be 
compensated for the loss of private benefits of control. 
 
In practice, the presence of the compensation rule injects an element of 
uncertainty into the takeover bid process. It is not possible to know precisely 
beforehand if and how much compensation will have to be paid.158 This 
uncertainty may in practice threaten takeover bids, especially those with 
some but not large capacity to add value since the bidder must make 
allowance for the risk of having to pay compensation. The greater this 
uncertainty is the more takeover bids will be affected.  
 
The effects of the requirement to pay compensation to the controlling 
shareholder who is deprived of rights under the breakthrough rules could in 
many ways be part of the third test, that of practical suitability. A choice has 
however been made to separate them from this test and discuss them in the 
final chapter when conclusions are drawn. 
3.7 The three-step test 
This chapter has set out a three-step test to be applied to the breakthrough 
rules. Should any of the tests fail it is doubtful that implementing the 
breakthrough rules will be advantageous, either for a member state or for an 
individual company. The test can be applied in sequence but should it be 
obvious that a particular situation will fail a later test the earlier tests can be 
skipped and that test applied directly. The three tests can be summarized as: 
 
• The test of necessity. Are controlling shareholders with greater 
control rights than cash-flow rights present? Are there signs of bad 
law or the extraction of large private benefits of control? 
• The test of theoretical suitability. Is there a large degree of 
separation between control rights and cash-flow rights? Is there a 
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potential to extract large private benefits of control? Are the 
enhanced control rights affected by the breakthrough rules? 
• The test of practical suitability. Is it difficult or costly to evade the 
rules? 
 
Only if the answer to all these questions is yes can it be considered 
advantageous to implement the breakthrough rules. In the final chapter the 
conclusions are affected by the requirement to pay compensation. 
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4 The economic background 
A number of situations where concentrated ownership may separate control 
rights and cash-flow rights are studied. These include mechanisms such as 
differential voting rights, pyramids and shareholder agreements. Their 
effects on the takeover situation are discussed. The case of IPO:s where 
founding owners wish to retain control rights in excess of their new cash-
flow rights is discussed separately. This chapter answers the second research 
question. 
4.1 Introduction 
We have previously touched upon the fact that different ownership 
structures may have implications regarding the agency conflicts inherent in 
the corporate form. In the case of dispersed ownership, the conflict between 
shareholders and management will become dominant while in the case of a 
controlling shareholder who is extracting private benefits of control, the 
conflict between the controlling and minority shareholders will dominate.159 
This chapter explores a number of different ownership and control structures 
and the conflicts inherent in them. 
 
The chapter makes no pretence at being exhaustive in its exploration, merely 
to cover a number of key points. The basic distinctions that will be studied 
are the degree of concentration of ownership, differential voting rights, 
shareholder agreements, constructions such as pyramids and crossholdings, 
and initial public offers. 
4.2 Concentration of ownership 
Traditionally the US and the UK have been taken to represent the case of 
dispersed ownership where no one shareholder has the power to exert 
control over management.160 On the other hand continental Europe has been 
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taken to represent economies dominated by controlling shareholders even if 
this does not mean that every company in these countries has or has had 
one.161 
 
In the case of dispersed ownership, the main agency conflict is between 
shareholders as a group and management who as insiders are capable of 
extracting private benefits of control if not disciplined.162 This has 
implications in the case of takeover bids where management may seek to 
block takeover bids that are advantageous to shareholders as a group for 
reasons of their own.163 
 
In the case of concentrated ownership, the potential conflict between 
management and shareholders as a group is reduced due to the ability of the 
controlling shareholder to discipline the management team.164 On the other 
hand the controlling shareholder has the ability to extract private benefits of 
control and as discussed earlier this comes at the possible expense of the 
minority shareholders.165  
 
Controlling shareholders may hold either an outright majority in terms of 
cash-flow rights or a controlling but non-majority position.166 The effects of 
control through a majority position is to give outright control but at the same 
time aligning control rights and cash-flow rights meaning that the majority 
owner pays for a large part of any private benefits of control extracted. In 
the absence of any special provisions such as golden shares the majority 
owner cannot normally be compelled to give up his controlling position and 
is thus free to resist a takeover bid.  
 
The non-majority controlling shareholder on the other hand has to some 
degree separated control rights and cash-flow rights. This can be either 
through a control enhancing mechanism or the rational apathy of the 
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minority shareholders.167  The possibility of extracting private benefits of 
control while being necessary to induce the controlling shareholder to 
undertake to discipline management increases the incentive to block a value 
adding takeover bid for rational reasons.168 
4.3 The role of banks and the state 
This section examines two special types of shareholders, banks and states. 
In for example Germany, it is not uncommon for banks to directly own 
blocks of shares in major corporations or to exercise influence over 
corporate decisions.169 This has the potential of creating a conflict between 
the bank in its role as an investor and as a lender.170 This is based on the fact 
that an investor normally has a greater appetite for risk than a lender.171 In 
these cases where banks take on both roles there is a perceived risk that the 
banks’ management will prioritize their responsibility towards their own 
shareholders, thus taking lesser risks than would be optimal for the other 
investors in the corporation in which the bank owns a stake.172 
 
The other special case is when the state owns control rights in listed 
corporations with the attendant potential to affect corporate decisions. 
Parallel to the discussion concerning banks owning large stakes this is also 
perceived to risk a conflict of interest. In this case this would be based on 
the risk that decisions by the state may be based on other, political or 
bureaucratic parameters than those of the other investors which could lead 
to a lower rate of return on the investment to the detriment of minority 
shareholders.173 
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A special situation of state ownership is those cases where the state holds a 
so called golden share in a company. A golden share is a term for a share 
that gives the holder special control rights despite holding very small if any 
cash-flow rights.174 This special case combines the potential for conflicting 
goals inherent in state ownership with the imbalance between control rights 
and cash-flow inherent in the golden share. 
 
To summarize, the perceived problem with banks and the state as 
shareholders is the risk that their investment decisions will be taken on 
different grounds than they would be if they had been ordinary investors. 
This carries the risk that minority shareholders in the corporations will 
receive a lower rate of return on their investments and thereby pay for the 
bank or the state achieving its other goal.175 Accepting shareholder value as 
a measure of the efficiency of corporate law, rules accepting that banks and 
the state lower shareholder value by pursuing other goals that corporate 
efficiency could be considered potentially inefficient. 
4.4 Differential voting rights 
A well-known tactic to maintain control of a company without owning the 
matching cash-flow rights has been implementing differential voting 
rights.176 This is done through the corporate charter where certain classes of 
shares, normally held by the controlling shareholder, have a higher voting 
power than others.177 This is still possible in some jurisdictions for example 
Sweden and the USA.178 In the Swedish case no share may have a voting 
power that is more than 10 times as high as any other share even though 
more extreme differences were allowed earlier.179 As will be discussed in 
conjunction with IPO:s the use of differential voting rights to maintain 
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control while introducing a company on the stock exchange is possibly on 
the rise again, at least in the US.180 
 
Differentiated voting rights allow a controlling shareholder to retain control 
rights in excess of the cash-flow rights owned by the shareholder. As 
discussed earlier this opens for the potential to extract private benefits of 
control at the expense of the minority shareholders. This in turn opens the 
possibility of a controlling shareholder turning down a takeover bid that 
does not adequately compensate for the possibility to extract private benefits 
of control. 
4.5 Pyramids and cross-holdings 
As mentioned in the introduction, pyramids and cross-holdings are other 
common methods for maintaining control rights in excess of the cash-flow 
rights owned by the shareholder. Compared to differential voting rights they 
work outside the corporate charter but the end result is the same. The 
controlling shareholder obtains control rights that are not matched by 
corresponding cash-flow rights. In the takeover situation, the effects are 
comparable to other control strategies. The controlling shareholder may 
choose to decline a value-adding bid since it does not compensate for the 
loss of private benefits of control. 
4.6 Shareholder agreements 
As noted earlier shareholders are free to enter into contractual agreements 
with each other over how to handle their shares.181 The contents of the 
different contractual agreements which are termed shareholder agreements 
may be diverse but commonly may include agreements on consultation, how 
to vote shares and the transferability of the shares.182 This is in no way 
uncommon and may just as restrictions on the transferability of shares 
embodied in the corporate charter serve an entirely legitimate purpose in 
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many cases, especially in small or medium sized corporations.183 They may 
however also serve the purpose of maintaining control within a smaller 
group of owners who together have the potential to control the 
corporation.184 
 
The potential problem with shareholder agreements is the risk that the 
concerned owners will use the corporation to extract private benefits of 
control, much as any controlling shareholder has the possibility to do. The 
difference in this case being that control has been achieved in cooperation 
with others through a shareholder agreement. The main differences 
compared to the situation with a controlling shareholder is that the 
extraction requires cooperation between the parties to the shareholder 
agreement and the degree of transparency in the control mechanism.185 
4.7 Transparency of control 
Shareholder agreements as private contracts are not always public 
knowledge and illustrate another facet of the question of controlling 
minorities, namely that of transparency.186 In the case of differential voting 
rights, the difference between control and cash flow rights is made possible 
through the corporate charter and potential investors can factor this into 
their decision. The potential investors do not on the other hand in all 
jurisdictions have the right to be informed of any potential shareholder 
agreements.187 This means that they may come as a total surprise to a 
shareholder who would not have invested in the corporation given 
knowledge of the existence of such an agreement. 
 
Two further constructions that may create transparency problems are 
pyramids and cross holdings which were discussed in more detail in the 
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introduction.188 This is based on the fact that they involve multiple 
companies thus increasing the cost of gathering information.189 The 
common denominator between them is that they just like the differential 
voting rights allow a controlling shareholder to retain control over a 
corporation without owning the corresponding cash-flow rights.190 This 
makes them another case of a controlling but non-majority shareholder that 
may extract private benefits of control at the expense of the other 
shareholders. 
4.8 Initial Public Offers 
A resurgence of the use of differential voting rights has been reported in 
conjunction with the initial listings of some companies in the US.191 This 
has, for example, allowed the entrepreneurs behind Facebook and Google to 
retain control of the companies even after the majority of the cash-flow 
rights has been sold to the public.192 In the most extreme case shares have 
been issued that carry no voting rights and without this being compensated 
for in any other way.193 
 
Initial Public Offers of companies, especially companies that have been 
started by visionaries or in new segments of the economy, are special in that 
it may well be in the interest of the new owners to entice the old leadership 
to stay with the company.194 To achieve this may possibly require giving 
them enhanced control rights. At the same time, it opens for conflicting 
interests between the founders whose control rights are not matched by 
corresponding cash-flow rights and the new majority owners who just as in 
the case with controlling but non-majority shareholders may risk paying for 
any private benefits of control that the founders may extract. 
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At the same time that the new investors may wish to retain the services of 
the founders of the company the founders wish to entice investors in order 
to cash in on the business they have built. This may give potential investors 
some leverage against the founders above what is normally available to 
minority shareholders in companies with a controlling shareholder. Further, 
it is not uncommon that a financial institution underwrites an IPO, thus 
guaranteeing its success.195 This may give the institution in question some 
degree of leverage over the founders and an interest in making the IPO as 
attractive as possible for investors. 
4.9 Summary 
To summarize, the efficiency, or not, of the breakthrough rules will be 
analysed against the following factors: 
 
• Concentration of ownership, majority owned, controlling 
shareholder, dispersed 
• Banks and states as owners 
• Differential voting rights 
• Shareholder agreements 
• Pyramids and crossholdings 
• Initial public offerings (IPO) 
                                                
195 Espen B. Eckbo and Ronald W. Masulis and Oyvind Norli, Security Offerings in 
HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE FINANCE: EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE 
(Vol. 1, B. E. Eckbo, ed., Chapter 6, pp. 233-373, Elsevier/North-Holland Handbook of 
Finance Series, 2007; Tuck School of Business Working Paper No. 2005-28) 10-11. 
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5 Interpreting the breakthrough 
rules 
The breakthrough rules of the takeover directive are interpreted using the 
methodology discussed in section 2.5. In general, a textual analysis is 
sufficient. However, the requirement that equitable compensation be paid if 
the rules remove for example differential voting rights is more problematic. 
It is interpreted in accordance with the goal to create a competitive market 
economy leading to the conclusion that some compensation is to be paid but 
not full compensation for all private benefits of control. The interpretation 
of the breakthrough rules answers the third research question. 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to legally interpret the breakthrough rules of 
the takeover directive so that they can be analysed against the described 
theory of economic efficiency. The method for this was described in section 
2.5. As a preliminary, case law concerning the takeover directive will be 
discussed. Thereafter the breakthrough rules will be discussed in terms of 
restrictions on the transferability of shares, voting rights and compensation. 
 
Case law from the CJEU concerning the takeover directive is comparatively 
sparse, a search yields a small number of cases.196 However, none of the 
cases concern the application of the breakthrough rules of article 11. Based 
on this absence of case law it is concluded that the breakthrough rules of the 
directive must be interpreted primarily based on their textual meaning and if 
this is not sufficient using a teleological method.  
 
This implies that when interpreting the breakthrough rules we must in those 
cases where the text is not sufficiently clear let us be guided by the 
                                                
196 For example, the pending case 658/16 Elliot International and Others 
concerning the proper application of article 5(4) of the takeover directive and the judgement 
in case C-101/08 Audiolux SA e.a v Groupe Bruxelles Lambert SA (GBL) and Others and 
Bertelsmann AG and Others (2009) ECR I-09823 
concerning article 3(1) of the takeover directive. 
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overarching goals stated in the treaties and the specific goals attendant to the 
takeover directive.197 Since the directive concerns the functioning of the 
capital market the freedom of movement of capital is noted in the preamble 
to the directive itself.198 Any interpretation of the directive must therefore be 
in conformity with the interpretation of the CJEU of the requirements of the 
freedom of movement of capital as expressed in the treaties.  
 
With these guides to interpretation in hand attention now turns to the text of 
article 11 of the directive. The discussion is divided into separate sections 
on voting rights, the transferability of shares and compensation. 
5.2 Voting rights 
Paragraphs 3 and 4 of article 11 have an impact on voting rights and will be 
examined in this section. Since paragraph 4 refers back to paragraph 3 it will 
be examined in detail first. The exact wording is as follows: 
 
“Restrictions on voting rights provided for in the articles of 
association of the offeree company shall not have effect at the general 
meeting of shareholders which decides on any defensive measures in 
accordance with article 9. 
 
Restrictions on voting rights provided for in contractual agreements 
between the offeree company and holders of its securities or in 
contractual agreements between holders of the offeree company’s 
securities entered into after the adoption of this directive shall not 
have effect at the general meeting of shareholders which decides on 
any defensive measures in accordance with article 9. 
 
Multiple-vote securities shall only carry one vote each at the general 
meeting of shareholders which decides on any defensive measures in 
accordance with article 9.”199    
 
At first glance this article is unambiguous. At a general meeting called to 
discuss defensive measures in reaction to a bid on the shares of the company 
each share will have one vote and any restrictions on one voting are null and 
void no matter if they are enshrined in the company charter or a shareholder 
                                                
197 Text to n 107. 
198 Takeover directive, Recital (20) of the preamble. 
199 Takeover directive art 11 paragraph 3. 
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agreement. The sole exception to this rule concerns shares whose restriction 
on voting rights is financially compensated in some way, for example 
preferred stock.200 
 
The question is however complicated by the reference to article 9 and the 
fact that implementing article 9(2) and9(3) is optional for member states.201 
It is also worth noting that a member state can choose to opt out of article 9 
and 11 independently of each other, it is not necessary to make the same 
choice in regard to both articles.202 
 
If a member state has chosen to implement article 11 and article 9 in its 
entirety the rule is as noted unambiguous. At a general meeting called to 
discuss defensive measures in regard to a bid, restrictions on voting rights 
are nullified. The clear language means that further interpretation is not 
necessary. 
 
If, however, a member state chose to implement article 11 but not article 9 
we must discuss if the part of article 11 which impacts on voting rights has 
any effect at all or not. The text explicitly states that the voting rights are 
abrogated only in a situation in accordance with article 9. A textual 
interpretation leads to the conclusion that it is only if article 9 has been 
adopted that the breakthrough rules can be applied to voting rights. In other 
cases, they have no effect. 
 
The exception to this rule arises in conjunction with article 9(4). While the 
preceding discussion concerned how the breakthrough rules may modify 
voting rights before a takeover or share purchase has taken place, this 
paragraph concerns itself with voting rights at a general meeting after the 
new owner has purchased at least 75 percent of the capital of the company if 
the meeting has been called to amend the corporate charter or elect board 
members.203 The paragraph states that in this situation voting rights are 
                                                
200 Takeover directive art 11 paragraph 6. 
201 Takeover directive art 12 
202 Takeover directive art 12 paragraph 1. This follows from the use of the phrase and/or at 
the end of the paragraph. 
203 Takeover directive art 9 paragraph 4. 
 54 
modified in the same way as in paragraph 3. In addition, any special rights 
given to specific shareholders regarding the appointment of board members 
are abrogated.204 
 
Article 11(4) does refer to the earlier paragraphs for a definition of what 
rights are nullified. This cannot be construed as to include the reference to 
article 9. Therefore, it is operative irrespective of whether or not article 9 
has been implemented or not.205 The effect of a breakthrough in accordance 
with this paragraph is therefore to allow a new supermajority owner to 
amend the corporate charter even if it contains provisions which would 
protect a controlling but minority shareholder. Further it hinders the old 
controlling shareholder from blocking the election of a new board through 
any mechanisms affected by the breakthrough rules.206 
5.3 Transferability of shares 
Article 11(2) of the takeover directive concerns restrictions on the 
transferability of shares and has the following wording: 
 
“Any restrictions on the transfer of securities provided for in the 
articles of association of the offeree company shall not apply vis-à-vis 
the offeror during the time allowed for acceptance of the bid laid 
down in article 7(1). 
 
Any restrictions on the transfer of securities provided for in 
contractual agreements between the offeree company and holders of 
its securities, or in contractual agreements between holders of the 
offeree company’s securities entered into after the adoption of this 
Directive, shall not apply vis-à-vis the offeror during the time allowed 
for acceptance of the bid laid down in article 7(1).”207 
 
In this case the wording is unambiguous, it is clear that restrictions on the 
transferability of shares are set aside during the period of a bid offer 
                                                
204 Takeover directive art 11 paragraph 4. 
205 Takeover directive art 11 paragraph 4 includes the text” voting rights referred to in 
paragraphs 2 and 3” which defines the voting rights. Paragraphs 2 and 3 refer to article 9 to 
determine when these rights are nullified. When the breakthrough desired by article 11(4) is 
to take place is defined in the paragraph itself so the reference to article 9 is not relevant for 
article 11(4). 
206 Takeover directive art 11 paragraph 4. 
207 Takeover directive art 11 paragraph 2. 
 55 
irrespective of whether the restriction is part of the corporate charter or a 
contractual agreement. The restrictions on transferability are however only 
set aside regarding the bidder. They remain in effect in respect to all other 
potential buyers of shares in the company.208 
5.4 Compensation 
Article 11(5) of the breakthrough directive concerns losses incurred by the 
implementation of the breakthrough rules and mandates that compensation 
shall be paid. The paragraph has the following wording: 
 
“Where rights are removed on the basis of paragraphs 2, 3, or 4 and/or 
Article 12, equitable compensation shall be provided for any loss 
suffered by the holders of those rights. The terms for determining such 
compensation and the arrangements for its payment shall be set by the 
Member States.”209 
 
From this article, it is clear that a member state that choses to implement the 
breakthrough rules has a duty to ensure that shareholders whose rights are 
removed under the provisions regarding voting rights and the transferability 
of shares are to be compensated. Since the directive is silent on the matter it 
is less clear how it is to be calculated.  
 
The question of compensation is important since it has effects for the cost to 
the bidder of acquiring control over the company.210 This cost cannot be 
calculated without a clear understanding of the requirement for 
compensation of the takeover directive. Before delving deeper into the exact 
requirements, it is worthwhile to discuss what could theoretically be 
compensated for.  
 
A controlling shareholder whose control rights exceed the cash-flow rights 
has, as has been discussed earlier, the possibility to extract private benefits 
of control.211 In the case of different share classes with differential voting 
                                                
208 Takeover directive art 11 paragraph 2. 
209 Takeover directive art 11 paragraph 5. 
210 Text to n 157 
211 Gilson (n 16) 1651. 
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rights this difference in control rights is impounded in the share price and 
the shares with greater control rights are publicly traded at a higher price 
under the label control premium.212 A full compensation of losses incurred 
by the controlling shareholder would therefore have to compensate for this 
loss of control rights. 
 
This seems to have been the position taken by Italy when it initially chose to 
implement the breakthrough rules based on the fact that courts could base 
their decision on compensation on share prices.213 The Swedish government 
on the other hand when discussing the possibility that companies would 
choose to implement the breakthrough rules through the corporate charter 
held that compensation would rarely become an issue.214  
 
While the rules for calculating the compensation to be paid for losses 
incurred under the breakthrough rules are left to the member states to 
formulate, the CJEU will be the final arbiter of if these rules fulfil the 
requirement of equitable compensation. At this point it is worth noting that 
the directive text does not require full compensation merely that it has to be 
equitable. This allows the court some leeway to interpret the directive such 
as to fulfil other overarching goals of the EU. 
 
The objectives of the directive are transparency and ensuring that cross-
border mergers are not unduly hindered.215 Outside of the directive one aim 
of the EU is the creation of ‘a highly competitive social market 
economy’.216 Another is the goal of creating an ever-closer union which has 
been cited since the founding of the EEC.217 
 
                                                
212 Aswath Damodaran, The Value of Control: Implications for Control Premia, Minority 
Discounts and Voting Share Differentials (June 30, 2005) 50-51. 
213 Cleary Gottlieb (n 65) 4. 
214 Proposition 2005/06: 140 Offentliga Uppköpserbjudanden på aktiemarknaden (2006) 
68. 
215 Takeover directive, recital 3 of the preamble. 
216 Treaty on the European Union art 3 paragraph 3. 
217 Neergard and Nielsen (n 106) 114 and with reference to article 2 of the treaty 
establishing the EEC. 
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The goal of creating a highly competitive market economy resonates with 
the role of corporate law to promote economic efficiency. As has been 
discussed this implies making it possible for value-adding takeover bids to 
succeed.218 It has also been discussed how stringent requirements that all 
losses of private benefits of control have to be compensated for may stop 
otherwise value-adding takeovers from taking place.219  
 
A teleological interpretation of the requirement for equitable compensation 
is therefore not compatible with a requirement that all losses of private 
benefits of control are to be compensated for since such an interpretation 
would in all likelihood block many value-adding takeover bids. It would 
also in practice set aside the equal price rule of article 5 of the takeover 
directive. This conclusion is based on the fact that the payment of full 
compensation for the loss of private benefits of control in addition to the 
price paid for the shares would in practice open up for the possibility that 
controlling shareholders will be paid a higher price for their shares than 
other shareholders.  
 
Regarding the fundamental goal of an ever-closer union this together with 
the freedom of capital within the union can be taken to preclude any 
nationality-based restrictions with regard to takeovers.220 The compensation 
rules of article 11(5) are on the other hand not affected by the nationality of 
either the bidder or incumbent owner making this goal of lesser interest for 
this interpretation. 
 
The conclusion taken from this discussion is that courts applying national 
law in the case of a dispute over compensation must award compensation 
for the loss of private benefits of control. They must on the other hand not 
award such high compensations as to hinder value-adding takeovers. This 
would seem to be a position somewhere between the two extremes 
represented by Italy and Sweden, some compensation, but possibly not full 
                                                
218 Berglöf and Burkart (n 71) 196-199. 
219 Text to n 157. 
220 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art 63 guarantees the freedom of 
movement regarding capital. 
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compensation for the loss of the control premium, while on the other hand 
not more or less ruling out any possibility of compensation as in the 
Swedish case. 
5.5 Excemptions 
Paragraphs 6 and 7 of article 11 contain provisions that exempt certain 
shares from the effects of the breakthrough rules. Paragraph 6 exempts 
shares whose limited voting rights is already compensated for monetarily.221 
The other case is the so called “golden shares” to which paragraph 7 
refers.222 In these cases the state, often in conjunction with a privatization, 
has retained a right to veto certain decisions through the ownership of shares 
with certain special rights.223 The text is clear in its meaning and only state-
owned shares can be exempted through it. 
 
Finally, not all shareholder agreements are set aside by the breakthrough 
rules. Concerning both voting rights and the transferability of shares only 
such agreements that have been entered into after the adoption of the 
directive are set aside.224 On one hand the wording is at first glance clear; 
the cut-off date is the adoption date of the takeover directive. On the other 
hand, such an interpretation may give the result that if a member state 
adopts the breakthrough rules in say 20 years’ time shareholder agreements 
that go back maybe decades in time are so to speak retroactively affected. 
 
In those cases where a company adopts the rules through its charter such an 
effect can be possibly defended since the possibility to do so has existed 
during the whole period from the adoption of the national rules 
implementing the directive. In the case of a change in national law there is a 
conflict between a clear textual meaning, the adoption date of the directive 
is the cut-off date and the perceived purpose of the rule. Evidently the rule 
                                                
221 Takeover directive, art 11 paragraph 5. 
222 Grundmann and Möslein (n 18) contains a general discussion on golden shares. 
223 Grundmann and Möslein (n 18) 2-4. 
224 Takeover directive, art 11 paragraph 2 subparagraph 2 and article 11 paragraph 3 
subparagraph 2. 
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strives to not affect agreements entered into before the directive became 
binding.  
 
Given the pre-eminence of the teleological method in the interpretation of 
EU law it is difficult to simply brush aside the conflict citing a clear 
wording. For this reason, the rule is interpreted to mean that should a 
member state at a date after that at which the directive is implemented 
choose to adopt the breakthrough rule that date is the cut-off date for the 
validity of shareholder agreements affecting the voting rights or 
transferability of shares. 
5.6 Summary regarding interpretation 
We summarize the above interpretation of the breakthrough rules by noting 
a number of key points: 
 
• Restrictions on voting rights and differential voting rights during the 
bid phase are broken through only if the member state has also 
adopted article 9. 
• Restrictions on the transferability of stock are always broken 
through.  
• A successful bidder who has acquired at 75% percent of the capital 
can take control over the corporation at a general meeting after the 
takeover relying on the breakthrough rules to nullify restrictions on 
voting rights and transferability. Differential voting rights do not 
apply at such a meeting. 
• A successful bidder must pay compensation to the holder of the 
rights that are nullified by the breakthrough rules. The size of the 
compensation may not unduly threaten value-adding takeovers. 
• The voting limitations of preferred stock and special rights of golden 
shares are not affected. 
• Shareholder agreements entered into before the breakthrough rules 
are adopted by a member state are not affected as regards limitations 
in the voting rights or transferability of shares. 
 60 
6 Analysis 
The breakthrough rules are tested against the different methods available to 
controlling shareholders with which to retain control using the three-step 
test devised in chapter three. It is found that in most cases the breakthrough 
rules either will not affect the situation or that they can be circumvented by 
a determined controlling shareholder and that there is in most cases little 
advantage to be found in implementing the breakthrough rules. Initial public 
offers are analysed separately and it is found there may be some advantage 
to introducing the rules in the corporate charter in order to build confidence 
with investors. This is dependent on the founders being able to convince 
investors that they will not attempt to evade the breakthrough rules. 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters have set up the framework through which the 
breakthrough rules are to be evaluated, discussed the different aspects of 
controlling shareholders against which the breakthrough rules are to be 
tested and interpreted the rules themselves. This chapter moves on to 
analysing the rules against this background 
 
First the analysis is carried out regarding a number of different mechanisms 
for a controlling shareholder to retain control rights in excess of the cash-
flow rights. A special section is devoted to the case of initial public offers. 
Thereafter the rule that gives a successful bidder who has acquired at least 
75 percent of the cash-flow rights is analysed.  
 
The analysis is carried out by applying the three-step test developed in 
chapter three to the specifics of each situation. Conclusions are drawn in 
each case. These conclusions are then carried forward into the final chapter 
of the thesis where the effects of the requirement for compensation to be 
paid to a controlling shareholder whose rights are removed by the 
application of the breakthrough rules is taken into account. 
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If nothing else is noted specifically the analysis draws upon the material 
presented in chapters three through five. In those cases where new material 
is introduced or if a particular author is referenced this will be referenced 
separately. 
6.2 Short recapitulation of the tests 
Before commencing the actual analysis, a short recapitulation of the tests 
that are to be carried out is made. They are: 
 
• The test of necessity. Are controlling shareholders with greater 
control rights than cash-flow rights present? Are there signs of bad 
law or the extraction of large private benefits of control? 
• The test of theoretical suitability. Is there a large degree of 
separation between control rights and cash-flow rights? Is there a 
potential to extract large private benefits of control? Are the 
enhanced control rights affected by the breakthrough rules? 
• The test of practical suitability. Is it difficult or costly to evade the 
rules? Is it manageable to pay the required compensation? 
 
Only if the answer to all these questions is yes can it be considered 
advantageous to implement the breakthrough rules. While there is a certain 
order to these tests it will not be followed in every instance. Should it be 
evident that the breakthrough rules will fail a later test in some instance the 
earlier tests will not be carried out. 
6.3 Controlling shareholders 
6.3.1 Common themes 
Should a company have a majority shareholder, and in the absence of any 
golden shares or other mechanism giving someone else enhanced control 
rights, the majority shareholder is free to turn down any takeover bids. In 
this case control rights and cash-flow rights are substantially aligned. The 
first test, the test of necessity has as its first element to look for differences 
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between control rights and cash-flow rights. Since these are not present in 
this case the situation fails the test of necessity and it is not advantageous to 
implement the breakthrough rules in this case. 
 
In the case of a company with dispersed ownership the control rights and 
cash-flow-rights are also already aligned. This case therefore also fails the 
test of necessity. Having summarily removed these two situations from 
consideration attention is now turned to the case of a company with a 
controlling but non-majority shareholder. 
 
In this case control rights and cash-flow rights are not aligned, leading to a 
situation where the controlling shareholder may wish to extract private 
benefits of control at the expense of the minority shareholders. The first test, 
that of necessity begins by looking for a situation where control rights and 
cash-flow rights are not aligned. As this is the case the case of a controlling 
shareholder passes the test in this regard.  
 
Moving on, the test of necessity examines if bad law or the extraction of 
large private benefits of control is present. This will be dependent on the 
individual situation. The question of the quality of the applicable law will be 
the same throughout a jurisdiction but the size of the private benefits of 
control may vary between owners implying that when analysing whether or 
not an individual company should implement the breakthrough rules in the 
corporate charter the conclusion may be dependent on the particular 
controlling shareholder. 
 
To conclude this discussion; The case of a controlling but non-majority 
shareholder passes the test of necessity especially if there is a case of bad 
law or if the shareholders, either generally in the case of a jurisdiction or in 
the individual case if the analysis is performed on the level of an individual 
company, are likely to extract large private benefits of control. Having noted 
this, we move on to the two later tests. In order to structure the discussion, 
the analysis is conducted separately depending on the method used to 
achieve the separation of control rights and cash-flow rights. 
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6.3.2 Differentiated voting rights 
First, we study the case where a controlling shareholder has used 
differentiated voting rights to separate control rights from cash-flow rights. 
It has already been noted that this situation passes the test of necessity. It is 
now time to apply the test of theoretical suitability which looks at the degree 
of separation between control rights and cash-flow rights, the size of private 
benefits of control and if the breakthrough rules are able to realign control 
rights and cash-flow rights.  
 
In the case of differentiated voting rights, we find that the greater the 
difference between control rights and cash-flow rights the greater likelihood 
that the breakthrough rules will be advantageous. The same also holds 
regarding the size of private benefits of control. The larger they are the 
greater the likelihood that it will be advantageous to implement the 
breakthrough rules. Finally, we find that the breakthrough rules are capable 
of aligning the control rights with the cash-flow rights since they replace the 
differentiated voting rights with the principle of one-share one-vote during 
the takeover process. A proposal to implement the breakthrough rules 
therefore passes the test of theoretical suitability in the case of differentiated 
voting rights and it is possible to move on to the third test. 
 
The test of practical suitability looks at the possibility of evading the effects 
of the breakthrough rules. As Bebchuk and Hart noted a controlling 
shareholder can plan ahead before any takeover bids are made and choose to 
move the basis of control from differential voting rights to, for example a 
pyramid scheme which is unaffected by the breakthrough rules.225 Thus, in 
most cases implementing the breakthrough rules fail the third test in regard 
to differential voting rights since there are methods for a determined 
controlling shareholder to circumvent the rules.  
 
The exception to this would be if the controlling shareholder is unable or 
unwilling to switch to another method of separating control rights from 
                                                
225 Bebchuk and Hart (n 27) 1-2. 
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cash-flow rights. Considering the fact that a proposal to implement the 
breakthrough rules in many cases fails the test of practical suitability it is 
not immediately advantageous to implement them to counter the effects of 
differentiated voting rights, especially as there may beneficial effects from 
the existence of controlling shareholders in disciplining management. 
6.3.3 Shareholder agreements 
A second control method explicitly targeted by the breakthrough rules is the 
use of shareholder agreements. They do so by simply stating that restrictions 
on transferability and voting rights embodied in such agreements do not 
apply in the takeover situation.226 This has the effect that a party to such an 
agreement cannot be forced to abide by it. However, there is no prohibition 
on the parties to voluntarily continue following the agreement for reasons of 
their own. 
 
Once again applying the test of theoretical suitability to the situation where 
controlling shareholders have used shareholder agreements to separate 
control rights and cash-flow rights the findings parallel those where 
differentiated voting rights have been used. Provided that one or more of the 
parties to the agreement is willing to break the agreement, the breakthrough 
rules can realign control rights and cash-flow rights and the benefits are 
likely larger the larger the separation is between control and cash-flow 
rights as well as in cases of large private benefits of control being extracted. 
The situation of control being exerted through shareholder agreements 
therefore passes the test of theoretical suitability and it is possible to move 
on to the third test. 
 
Moving on to the third test, that of practical suitability or the possibility of 
evasion, we find that a controlling shareholder who is dependent on a 
shareholder agreement has two options in order to retain control. Either to 
switch to another control mechanism or to convince the other parties to the 
                                                
226 Takeover directive, art 11 paragraph 2 subparagraph 2 and article 11paragraph 3 
subparagraph 2. 
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shareholder agreement to continue to honour it even though they cannot be 
forced to do so. The first would be a form of evasion and would mean that a 
proposal to implement the breakthrough rules fails the third test. It would 
however require the capital to invest in further shares and so is not an 
obvious failure especially since existing owners cannot be compelled to sell 
the necessary shares. 
 
There is a risk that parties to a shareholder agreement may continue to abide 
by it based on the same reasons that induced them to enter into it in the first 
instance. They could for example wish to retain the ability to extract private 
benefits of control. If this is the case it would also mean that this situation 
has failed the third test, that of practical suitability.  
 
To summarize, the situation where control is exercised through a 
shareholder agreement passes the test of necessity and the test of theoretical 
suitability. In the case of the test of practical suitability it is however less 
clear-cut. In some instances, the situation may pass the test, in others not. It 
is therefore not immediately clear if it would be advantageous to implement 
the breakthrough rules or not to counter the effects of shareholder 
agreements. It is also worth noting that the breakthrough rules have no 
effect on older shareholder agreements. 
6.3.4 Pyramids and cross-holdings 
The functioning of pyramids and cross holdings is not affected by the 
breakthrough rules.227 A situation where a controlling shareholder relies on 
either of these techniques therefore fails the test of theoretical suitability 
since the breakthrough rules are not capable of realigning the control rights 
with the cash-flow rights. If controlling shareholders commonly base their 
control on either pyramids or crossholdings it is not advantageous to 
implement the breakthrough rules since it was assumed that in cases where 
the proposed regulation is ineffectual it is better to not regulate. 
                                                
227 Bebchuk and Hart (n 27) 1-2. 
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6.3.5 States and golden shares 
One special case of a minority shareholder being able to block an otherwise 
value-adding takeover bid is when a state exerts control through possessing 
a golden share. As discussed earlier this means that the state is given a 
deciding control right in one or several situations with little or maybe no 
corresponding cash-flow rights. 
 
This situation is clearly a case of control rights being separated from cash-
flow rights. However, because of the exemption from the breakthrough rules 
of golden shares it fails the second test, that of theoretical suitability since 
the breakthrough rules are unable to realign the control rights with the cash-
flow rights. As is the case with pyramids and cross-holdings and based on 
the same assumption it is not therefore advantageous to implement the 
breakthrough rules in this case either. 
6.4 Banks 
It was noted earlier that banks may have interests and preferences that 
diverge from other shareholders. In those cases where a bank holds control 
rights in excess of their cash-flow rights this could lead to the bank 
following its own preferences, the ability to do so can be compared to a 
private benefit of control which the bank would be extracting at the expense 
of other shareholders. In such a case, the analysis can proceed as is the case 
with other controlling shareholders.  
 
The exact details of the analysis will depend on which method the bank in 
question has used to separate the control rights from the cash-flow rights, 
the quality of law and the size of the private benefits of control being 
extracted in the form of prioritizing the banks agenda ahead of shareholder 
value. Finally, the value of the bank as in the form of exerting control over 
management and thereby curbing the benefits of control that it can extract 
must be taken into account. This is done in the same way as for other 
controlling shareholders. 
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6.5 Initial public offerings (IPO) 
IPO:s where a founding owner retains control rights in excess of the cash-
flow rights will in general be analysed as any other such situation with 
reference to the above discussion. However, two elements are added to the 
analysis. The investors may have an increased degree of leverage over the 
founders as discussed earlier and the founders who wish to cash in on their 
earlier work need to entice the investors to invest in the IPO.228 
 
Applying the test of necessity, we find that in cases where control rights and 
cash-flow rights are not aligned the situation passes the first test especially 
if bad law or large private benefits of control are present. The analysis in 
this part does not differ from the non-IPO situation. Moving on to the 
second test, that of theoretical suitability, we find that the breakthrough 
rules will align the control rights with the cash-flow rights if the founders 
have chosen differential voting rights as the mechanism for retaining 
control. In case of a shareholder agreement the situation is more unclear 
since the founders cannot be forced to break the agreement. We therefore 
find that in cases of differential voting rights this situation passes the second 
test, that of theoretical suitability. 
 
Moving on to the third test, that of practical suitability we find the same 
possibility as earlier that the controlling shareholder may try to evade the 
breakthrough rules by changing the mechanism by which control is 
retained.229 However, should the controlling shareholder be able to convince 
the minority owners that this will not happen, at least not for the foreseeable 
future the IPO situation will pass the third test, that of practical suitability.  
 
This is based on the special situation of the IPO where the founders as 
controlling shareholders need the investors in a different way than is the 
case in the mid-stream phase of a company’s existence, giving the investors 
an increased degree of leverage over the controlling shareholder. This 
                                                
228 Text at n 195. 
229 As for differentiated voting rights. 
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increased leverage may mean that the controlling shareholder is more 
willing to provide assurance that the control mechanism will not be 
changed. Frankly, the investors are able to demand assurances in return for 
capital. 
6.6 The 75% Rule 
Lastly, the analysis will touch upon a part of the breakthrough rules that 
applies to the post-takeover situation. This rule is meant to ensure that a 
controlling shareholder is not able to continue to exert this control after a 
successful takeover bid and is considered separately from the earlier 
discussion which has taken its start in characteristics of the ownership of the 
company.  
 
The rule mandates that a bidder who has acquired at least 75 percent of the 
cash flow rights is able to shortly after the takeover call a general meeting 
during which differential voting rights and restrictions on voting rights and 
the transfer of shares are set aside.230 Any provisions in the charter giving 
any shareholder special rights regarding the composition of the board are 
also set aside.231 The effect is to align control rights with cash-flow rights in 
those areas that are affected by the rule. 
 
When applying the first test, that of necessity to this rule we find that the 
situation that a minority shareholder exercises special rights at a general 
meeting is a clear case of a separation of control rights from cash-flow 
rights. This conclusion is based on the fact that this rule only applies if the 
successful bidder has acquired at least 75 percent of the cash-flow rights.  
 
Restrictions in the corporate charter of this nature may preclude a new 
owner of the majority of the cash-flow rights from exercising control of the 
company. As such the situation passes the first test, that of necessity, 
especially if there is bad law or large private benefits of control.  
 
                                                
230 Takeover directive, art 11 paragraph 4. 
231 Takeover directive, art 11 paragraph 4. 
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Regarding the second test, that of theoretical suitability we note that the 
provisions of the breakthrough directive are capable of realigning the 
control rights and cash-flow rights in this case based on the fact that the 
restrictions are embodied in the corporate charter which is susceptible to 
legal intervention. This situation therefore passes the second test. 
 
In regard to the third test, that of practical suitability which begins by testing 
if the proposed rule can be evaded it has however been pointed out that an 
incumbent controlling shareholder can counter the effects of the 75 percent 
rule provided the financial means are available to increase its ownership to 
more than 25 percent.232 This would deprive any potential new majority 
owner of the possibility of relying on the breakthrough rule in this aspect.233  
 
Under the assumption that the incumbent owners have the financial ability 
to increase their holdings even slightly above the 25 percent threshold they 
therefore have the ability to pre-emptively block a potential successful 
takeover bidder from removing defensive measures from the corporate 
charter after the takeover. This would make a potentially value-adding 
takeover less interesting to the bidder since the ability to add value through 
the takeover may be dependent on acquiring control over the company. The 
rule thereby fails the third test since it is in many situations possible for a 
controlling shareholder to evade its effects and it is not advantageous to 
implement the breakthrough rules with regard to this rule. 
                                                
232 Bebchuk and Hart (n 27) 1-2. 
233 Takeover directive, art 11 paragraph 4 requires the new majority owner to own at least 
75 percent of the cash-flow rights for the rule to be applicable. 
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7 Conclusions 
Conclusions are drawn from the analysis in the previous chapter and the 
effects of the requirement to pay compensation to controlling shareholders 
is assessed. It is found that there are few situations when it is advantageous 
to implement the breakthrough rules. The most promising situation is that of 
initial public offers. All situations are highly dependent on the level of 
compensation that is required and the clarity of the rules regarding this. 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter analysed the potential effects of introducing the 
breakthrough rules against a number of different methods by which 
controlling shareholders may seek to separate control rights and cash-flow 
rights. This section fulfils the purpose of the thesis by using this analysis to 
make a normative judgement on the breakthrough rules. More precisely it 
will discuss if and under what circumstances it is advantageous for a 
member state or an individual company to choose to implement the rules. 
The two cases are discussed separately. 
7.2 Should member states implement 
When studying companies in the mid-stream phase of their existence little 
evidence is found that it is advantageous to implement the breakthrough 
rules for a member state. Berglöf and Burkart note that in theory the rules 
combined with the demand that all shareholders are offered the same price 
would ensure that all value-adding takeovers and only those take place.234 
However, the rules only affect some methods for separating control rights 
and cash-flow rights. Pyramids, cross-holdings and the golden shares of 
states are found to be unaffected.  
 
Should a state choose to implement the breakthrough rules, value-adding 
takeovers aimed at companies whose controlling shareholders utilize 
                                                
234 Berglöf and Burkart (n 71) 197 and 199.  
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differentiated voting rights or shareholder agreements will have a higher 
probability to succeed since the breakthrough rules were found to align 
control rights with cash-flow rights in these cases. However, as 
advantageous as this might seem it brings with it the risk that determined 
controlling shareholders will transfer from primarily differentiated voting 
rights to other control mechanisms such as pyramids and cross-holdings that 
are not affected by the breakthrough rules.235 
 
It is also worth remembering Gilson’s thoughts on good versus bad law and 
the size of private benefits of control.236 He states that the presence of 
controlling shareholders may actually benefit the minority shareholders 
provided that the laws are of good quality and that the extracted private 
benefits of control are less than the amount gained from disciplining 
management.237 This actually reduces the already indistinct advantages of 
implementing the breakthrough rules in those cases where good law or small 
private benefits of control are present. In these cases, it may be more 
advantageous to accept the down-sides of the existence of controlling 
shareholders than to implement the breakthrough rules and risk losing the 
disciplining effect on management provided by the controlling shareholders. 
 
The question is further complicated by the compensation rule of the 
breakthrough rules. The uncertainty of how to calculate the necessary 
compensation risks means that it may be difficult or even impossible for a 
bidder to calculate the true cost of a takeover bid. This may lead to a 
situation where in theory the breakthrough rules would be advantageous but 
in practice there is an opposite reaction where potential bidders become 
wary of exposing themselves to claims for compensation that are difficult to 
calculate. This problem can be alleviated, at least to some extent, if member 
states create clear rules regarding how compensation is to be calculated.238 
                                                
235 Bebchuk and Hart (n 27) 1-2. 
236 Text at n 139. 
237 Lin (n 18) 472 also notes that there is a value in the disciplining of management 
provided by controlling shareholders that may well exceed the cost to the minority 
shareholders of there being a controlling shareholder. 
238 Takeover directive, art 11 paragraph 5 charges the member states with creating detailed 
rules regarding how compensation is to be calculated. 
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To summarize; under the following circumstances it would be advantageous 
for a member state to implement the breakthrough rules: 
 
• The main control strategy used by controlling shareholders is 
differentiated voting rights. 
• Controlling shareholders are unlikely to choose another strategy. 
• The jurisdiction is characterized by bad law and/or high private 
benefits of control. 
• The required compensation has been clearly defined. 
 
In addition, the breakthrough rules may have some advantageous effects on 
shareholder agreements under the same conditions regarding law and the 
size of private benefits of control. Since a consensus was found regarding 
the likelihood that controlling shareholders would choose to move to some 
other control mechanism, for example pyramid structures, when prior 
research was summarized the combination of circumstances required for the 
breakthrough rules to be advantageous seems less likely to occur in reality.  
7.3 Should companies implement 
7.3.1 The mid-stream phase 
So far, the discussion has concerned the mid-stream phase of companies and 
when it is advantageous for member state to implement the rules on a 
national level. The attention now turns to under what circumstances it would 
be advantageous for a company to implement the rules through the 
corporate charter.  
 
For companies in the mid-stream phase the conclusions parallel that 
regarding when it is advantageous for a state to implement the rules. The 
basic premises are the same even if the decision can be more closely tailored 
to the specific situation of the individual company. On the other hand, there 
could be a down-side to one company introducing rules through the 
corporate charter that differ widely from those that are prevailing within the 
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jurisdiction since bespoke corporate charter arrangements may introduce an 
element of legal uncertainty.239 
 
On balance the conclusion is that for firms in the mid-stream phase of their 
existence special circumstances must be present for it to be advantageous to 
implement the breakthrough rules through the corporate charter. In those 
cases where it would be undeniably advantageous, and these are those cases 
where control is leveraged through differentiated voting rights or possibly 
shareholder agreements it is also questionable if the controlling shareholder 
has any incentive to risk the controlling position that it enjoys.  
7.3.2 The IPO-phase 
When discussing a company on the brink of going public the conclusions 
become slightly different. The main conclusions regarding which 
circumstances are required for it to be advantageous to adopt the 
breakthrough rules are the same. We must be considering using differential 
voting shares or possibly a shareholder agreement to retain control, there 
must be a potential for the extraction of large private benefits of control and 
the compensation rules must be clear. If this is the case the situation fulfils 
the three-step test applied in the analysis. 
 
Added to this is the special situation inherent in the IPO. The founders may 
want to instil a greater confidence in investors who might have greater 
leverage on the company going public than is normally the case. This could 
create the opening for the founders to adopt the breakthrough rules through 
the corporate charter in order to attract more investors. The likelihood of 
this is reduced by the use of standardized corporate charters in IPO 
situations.240 Leaving this norm may entail an offsetting confidence loss 
based on the risk of bespoke solutions creating legal ambiguity making it 
less advantageous to adopt the breakthrough rules. 
 
                                                
239 Lin (n 18) 483 discusses this in conjunction with IPO:s. 
240 Lin (n 18) 483. 
 74 
At this point the IPO-phase seems the most promising from the point of 
view of finding situations when it would be advantageous to implement the 
breakthrough rules through the corporate charter. This is however dependant 
on three key factors. These are: 
 
• The founders must be attempting to retain control through 
differentiated voting rights and be able to project that they will 
continue to do so. 
• The rules regarding compensation must be clear and not 
prohibitively expensive. 
• It must be possible to contain the legal ambiguities inherent in 
bespoke solutions.  
 
Only if all these three factors are present will it in practice be advantageous 
to implement the breakthrough rules through the corporate charter. 
7.4 Final verdict 
To summarize, little evidence has been found indicating that it is 
advantageous for member states to implement the breakthrough rules of the 
takeover directive. In those situations where the rules are theoretically 
suitable, differential voting rights, bad law and high private benefits of 
control, the risk of evasion through pyramids or cross-ownership is likely to 
cancel out the benefits of implementing them. 
 
The same reasoning generally applies when a company is evaluating the 
possibility of implementing the rules through the corporate charter. 
However, since the rules would only apply to one company it is possible 
that those circumstances that make an implementation advantageous would 
apply to this one company even if it would not be advantageous for the state 
to adopt the rules as mandatory for all companies. This could increase the 
likelihood of an advantageous situation being present with regard to one 
company somewhat compared to when the analysis was performed on the 
member state level.  
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However, the legal uncertainties inherent in bespoke solutions and the 
requirement to pay compensation and the uncertainty of how this 
compensation is to be calculated make it less likely that it will be 
advantageous to implement the breakthrough rules through the corporate 
charter. This decreases the number of situations when it will be 
advantageous. Taken together the conclusion is that while there may be 
special cases where it is advantageous for a company to adopt the 
breakthrough rules through the corporate charter even though it is not 
advantageous for the member state these situations will be an exception. 
 
Turning to the IPO situation it was found that since investors, especially 
those underwriting the IPO, are likely to have increased leverage over 
founders contemplating an IPO this situation is the more likely to show 
advantages to implementing the breakthrough rules through the corporate 
charter. Having said this it is worth remembering that the corporate charter 
is seldom customized in the case of an IPO.241  
 
It is instead reported that most IPO:s use standardized charters irrespective 
of if they are a good fit for the specific company or not.242 The question then 
becomes if the gain in investor confidence accruing from the use of the 
breakthrough rules offsets the loss to be expected from the potential legal 
ambiguity inherent in the use of non-standard provisions. As before, the 
analysis is very dependent on the rules regarding compensation. 
 
To summarize; there are few situations when it is advantageous to 
implement the breakthrough rules, primarily since they cover far from all 
methods of separating control rights and cash-flow rights and in many 
instances, can be evaded. This holds true in most instances for the individual 
company case as well as on the national level. The most promising situation 
is that concerning IPO:s. If it in the end will be advantageous or not is 
highly dependent on the size of the compensation which must possibly later 
be paid to controlling shareholders under the breakthrough rules.   
                                                
241 Lin (n 18) 485. 
242 Lin (n 18) 485. 
 76 
Bibliography 
Litterature 
John Armour, Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman and Mariana 
Pargendler, What is Corporate Law? in Reinier H. Kraakman (ed), The 
anatomy of corporate law: a comparative and functional approach (Third 
edn, Oxford, 2017) 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Investor Activism: Reshaping the Playing Field? 
(May, 2008 UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 08-
12) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1130969> accessed 2017-12-21 
 
Margaret M. Blair; Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate 
Law (24 J. Corp. L. 1999)  
Lucien Bebchuk and Oliver Hart, A Threat to Dual-Class Shares (Financial 
Times May 31, 2002) 
 
Lucien A. Bebchuk and Reinier Kraakman and George Triantis, Stock 
Pyramids, Cross Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and 
Agency Costs of Separating Control from cash-Flow Rights in Randall 
Morck (ed.), Concentrated corporate ownership (University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 2000) 
 
Erik Berglöf and Mike Burkart, European Takeover Regulation (18 
ECONOMIC POLICY 171, 2003)  
Andreas Cahn and David C. Donald, Comparative company law: text and 
cases on the laws governing corporations in Germany, the UK and the USA 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010) 
 
Blanaid Clarke, Takeover Regulation - Through the Regulatory Looking 
Glass (8 German L.J. 381, 412, 2007)  
Cleary Gottlieb, Implementation of the Takeover Directive in Italy (2008) 
<www.clearygottlieb.com> accessed on November 8 2017 
 
Aswath Damodaran, The Value of Control: Implications for Control 
Premia, Minority Discounts and Voting Share Differentials (June 30, 2005) 
< https://ssrn.com/abstract=837405> accessed 2017-12-21 
 
Espen B. Eckbo and Ronald W. Masulis and Oyvind Norli, Security 
Offerings in HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE FINANCE: EMPIRICAL 
CORPORATE FINANCE (Vol. 1, B. E. Eckbo, ed., Chapter 6, pp. 233-373, 
Elsevier/North-Holland Handbook of Finance Series, 2007; Tuck School of 
Business Working Paper No. 2005-28) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=863664> 
 
 77 
European Commision, REPORT FROM THE COMMISION TO THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF 
THE REGIONS, Application of Directive 2004/25/EC on takeover bids 
(2012) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/takeoverbids/COM2012
_347_en.pdf> accessed on 15 November 2017 
 
Luca Enriquez and Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman and Mariana 
Pargendler, The Basic Governance Structure: Minority Shareholders and 
Non-Shareholder Constituencies in Reinier H. Kraakman (ed), The anatomy 
of corporate law: a comparative and functional approach (Third edn, 
Oxford, 2017) 
 
Pablo Fernandez, Company Valuation Methods (October 11, 
2017)  <https://ssrn.com/abstract=274973>  
 
Guido Ferrarini and Geoffrey P. Miller, A Simple Theory of Takeover 
Regulation in the United States and Europe (42 Cornell Int'l L.J. 2009) 
  
Martin Gelter, The Dark Side of Shareholder Influence: Toward a Holdup 
Theory of Stakeholders in Comparative Corporate Governance (March 17, 
2008 ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 096/2008; CLEA 2008 Meetings 
Paper; Harvard Olin Fellows' Discussion Paper No. 17/2008) 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=1106008> 
 
Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: 
Complicating the Comparative taxonomy (119 Harv. L. Rev. 2006) 
 
Ronald J. Gilson and David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital 
Structure: A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock (February, 
2002 Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 199; Stanford Law 
and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 230) 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=301225> accessed 2017-12-21 
 
Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 
1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices (59 Stan. L. 
Rev. 2007)  
Stefan Grundmann and Florian Möslein, Golden Shares - State Control in 
Privatised Companies: Comparative Law, European Law and Policy 
Aspects (April 2003). <https://ssrn.com/abstract=410580> 
 
Oliver Hart, An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm (89 
Colum. L. Rev. 1989)  
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Shearman & Sterling LLP and 
European Corporate Governance Institute, Report on the Proportionality 
Principle in the European Union (2007)  
 78 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/shareholders/study/final
_report_en.pdf> accessed on 13 november 2017 
 
Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure (July 1, 
1976) in Michael C. Jensen, A THEORY OF THE FIRM: GOVERNANCE, 
RESIDUAL CLAIMS AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS, (Harvard 
University Press, December 2000; Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), 
Vol. 3, No. 4, 1976) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=94043> accesed 2017-12-21 
 
Rafael La Porta and Florencio Lopez de Silanes and Andrei Shleifer and 
Robert W. Vishny, Agency Problems and Dividend Policies Around the 
World (June 1998 NBER Working Paper No. w6594) 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=226317> 
 
Hyun-Chul Lee, The Hidden Costs of Private Benefits of Control: Value 
Shift and Efficiency (29 J. Corp. L. 2004)  
Yu-Hsin Lin, Controlling Controlling-Minority Shareholders: Corporate 
Governance and Leveraged Corporate Control (2017 Colum. Bus. L. rev. 
453, 510 2017)  
 
Marina Martynova and Luc Renneboog, Takeover Regulation in H. Kent 
Baker and Halil Kiymaz, Halil (eds.), The art of capital restructuring: 
creating shareholder value through mergers and acquisitions (Wiley, 
Hoboken, N.J., 2011) 
 
Jonathan Mukwiri, Takeovers and the European Legal Framework A British 
Perspective (Routledge-Cavendish, London and New York, 2009) 
<https://books.google.se/books?id=Ggt6AgAAQBAJ&pg=PA115&lpg=PA
115&dq=implementation+of+the+takeover+directive+in+italy&source=bl&
ots=Mg2cYRM37F&sig=MGoqf2Ex9sjpWpBzo9A82yhposU&hl=sv&sa=
X&ved=0ahUKEwjS14v0ksDXAhVIfRoKHR81CJoQ6AEIUjAG#v=onepa
ge&q=implementation%20of%20the%20takeover%20directive%20in%20it
aly&f=false> 
 
Ulla Neergard and Ruth Nielsen, Where Did the Spirit and Its Friends Go? 
On the European Legal Method(s) and the Interpretational Style of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union in Ulla B. Neergaard and Ruth Nielsen and 
Lynn M. Roseberry (ed.), European legal method: paradoxes and 
revitalisation (DJØF, Copenhagen, 2011) 
 
Alessio M. Pacces, and Louis T. Visscher, Methodology of Law and 
Economics (Bart van Klink and Sanne Taekema (Eds.), Law and Method. 
Interdisciplinary research into Law (Series Politika, nr 4, Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck 2011, pp. 85-107) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2259058> 
 
 79 
Shailendra (Shail) Pandit, Takeover strategies in H. Kent Baker and Halil 
Kiymaz (eds.), The art of capital restructuring: creating shareholder value 
through mergers and acquisitions (Wiley, Hoboken, N.J., 2011) 
 
Pavesio E Associato, Italy takeover Guide (2013) accessed at 
<https://www.google.se/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&v
ed=0ahUKEwjS14v0ksDXAhVIfRoKHR81CJoQFgg4MAI&url=https%3A
%2F%2Fwww.ibanet.org%2FDocument%2FDefault.aspx%3FDocumentUi
d%3D8434AD45-D36E-476F-B3A6-
94B0C21F583A&usg=AOvVaw1aw8XrHf8ZWnfujAYgFvT2> 
 
Francesco Parisi, Positive, Normative and Functional Schools in Law and 
Economics (European Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 
259-272, December 2004, George Mason Law & Economics Research 
Paper No. 04-22) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=586641> 
 
Stefano Cachi Pessani and Bonelli Erede and Olivier Assant and Bredin Prat 
and Bernard Roelvink and De Brauw and Oliver Rieckers  and Hengeler 
Mueller and Chris McGaffin and Slaughter and May and Gabriel Núñez and 
Uría Menéndez, Guide to public takeovers in Europe (2016)  
<https://www.debrauw.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Guide-to-Public-
Takeovers-in-Europe-2016.pdf> accessed on 13 november 2017 
Jane Reichel, EU-rättslig metod in Fredric Korling and Mauro Zamboni, 
Mauro (eds.), Juridisk metodlära (Studentlitteratur, Lund 2013) 
Wolf-Georg Ringe, Deviations from Ownership-Control Proportionality - 
Economic Protectionism Revisited in COMPANY LAW AND ECONOMIC 
PROTECTIONISM - NEW CHALLENGES TO EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION, U. Bernitz and W.G. Ringe, eds., (OUP, 2010; Oxford 
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 23/2011) 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=1789089> 
 
Edward B. Rock The Logic and (Uncertain) significance of Institutional 
Shareholder Activism (79 Goe. L.J, 1991) 
 
Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance 
(The Journal of Finance, Vol. LII, No. 2 June, 1997) 
 
George C. Triantis, Financial Contract Design in the World of Venture 
Capital (University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 68, Winter 2001)< 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=258392> accessed on  2017-12-21 
 
Vladimir Bastidas Venegas, Rättsekonomi in Fredric Korling and Mauro 
Zamboni, Mauro (eds.), Juridisk metodlära (Studentlitteratur, Lund 2013) 
 
Marco Ventoruzzo Comparative corporate law (West Academic, St. Paul, 
Minn., 2015) 
 
 80 
Proposals (propositioner) to the Swedish Parliament 
 
Proposition 2005/06: 140 Offentliga Uppköpserbjudanden på 
aktiemarknaden (2006) 
 
 81 
Table of Cases 
Cases of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
 
26/62 NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & 
Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration. ECR 2 
 
6/64 Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L. (1964) ECR 587 
 
14/83 Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v Land Nordrhein-
Westfalen (1984) ECR 1892 
 
C-101/08 Audiolux SA e.a v Groupe Bruxelles Lambert SA (GBL) and 
Others and Bertelsmann AG and Others (2009) ECR I-09823 
 
Pending cases of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
 
C-658/16 Elliot International and Others 
 
